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"When a great question is first started, there are very few . . .
minds, which suddenly and instinctively comprehend it in all its
consequences. "
- John Adams'
Although acknowledging that "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings "2 was
enacted "to meet a national fiscal emergency . . . of unprecedented mag-
nitude,"' in Bowsher v. Synar4 the Supreme Court nevertheless declared
its key provision unconstitutional.
Section 251 of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings' directed the Comptroller
General to prepare a report to the President and Congress specifying
program-by-program budget reductions necessary to prevent the deficit for
the coming fiscal year from exceeding the maximum permitted by the stat-
ute.6 Seven justices agreed that this provision violates the Constitution.
The goal of this Article is to assess where we stand in the war against
the deficit after Bowsher v. Synar and to suggest an alternative approach
for regulating the deficit in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision.
The Article has four Parts. Part I summarizes and criticizes the decision
in Bowsher v. Synar. The conclusion is that the Supreme Court over-
looked the key constitutional issue posed by the statute: whether the Presi-
dent may be compelled to follow the Comptroller General's ruling regard-
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1. Quoted in C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 94 (1966).
2. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat.
1038, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-922 (West Supp. 1986) [hereinafter cited by its popular name, "Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings," for its three principal sponsors].
In general terms, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sets "maximum deficit amounts" for each fiscal year
from 1986 through 1991. The size of the maximum deficit amounts permitted under the statute grad-
ually declines to zero by 1991.
3. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3192-93 (1986).
4. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
5. 2 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West Supp. 1986).
6. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 252 purports to allow the President no discretion in making the
cuts. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
7. Those justices were Burger, Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Stevens, and Marshall.
Copyright 0 1987 by the Yale Journal on Regulation. 317
Yale Journal on Regulation
ing the amounts to be cut from the budget. The Court should have
declined to decide that issue at this time, however, since a concrete case
had not yet arisen in which the President refused to follow the Comptrol-
ler General's recommendation. Instead, the Court should have held that a
challenge to the Comptroller General's role under Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings was not yet "ripe" in advance of an actual controversy about
how the Comptroller General had exercised his functions.
Part II takes a broader view, assessing the significance of Bowsher v.
Synar from two different perspectives: First, the case is considered as the
latest in a line of separation of powers precedents that reflect the current
Supreme Court's hostility to innovation in the design of governmental
institutions; second, the decision is seen as delivering a major blow to the
search for a legal mechanism for dealing with what many consider one of
the country's most serious problems-a federal budget deficit that appears
to be out of control.8
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was not perfect, but it was the most promis-
ing measure yet tried to bring the deficit under control.9 Consequently, it
was regrettable, even irresponsible, for the Supreme Court to go out of its
way to gut Gramm-Rudman-Hollings based on a tenuous and speculative
separation of powers analysis before giving the statute a fair chance to
work.
Part III explores an alternative approach for dealing with the deficit
now that the Supreme Court has eviscerated Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
The perspective adopted is original in that the deficit is analyzed as a
problem in regulation, and one possible cause of the deficit is traced to the
incentives created by congressional voting procedures. To modify these
incentives, the concept of "Dependent Taxation and Budgeting in Ar-
rears" is proposed as a possible reform.
Part IV is a conclusion that attempts to place Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings and Bowsher v. Synar in the broader context of the uncertain
constitutional status of "framework statutes,"10 such as the War Powers
8. It is beyond the scope of this Article (and beyond the competence of its author) to assess how
serious a policy problem the federal deficit really is. A recent newspaper article reported that many
people feel that the federal budget deficit is the most important problem facing the country. Sherman,
Deficit Is a Vital Issue to Voters, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at At, col. 1. As the Court did in
Bowsher v. Synar, I assume that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was enacted to deal with what Congress
considered to be a serious national problem.
9. See Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1098-1101,
1103-04 (expressing skepticism that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings "really represents decisive action by
the Congress to deal with the deficit" but noting that there was a possibility that the statute might
"work" because it changed the incentive structure for politicians, albeit in ways that "may not be as
desirable" as reforms that might be suggested by constitutional convention).
For a summary of previous unsuccessful attempts to deal with the deficit, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 155-56.
10. The term was invented by Gerhard Casper to describe statutes in which Congress purports to
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Resolution, 1 which purport to establish procedures for regulating con-
flicts between branches of government.
I. The Bowsher v. Synar Decision
Hours after Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was signed into law on Decem-
ber 12, 1985, Alan Morrison, litigation director of Ralph Nader's Public
Citizen, Inc., filed suit in the name of Oklahoma Congressman Mike
Synar seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitu-
tional.1" The National Treasury Employees Union filed a similar suit
alleging that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deprived its members of a sched-
uled cost-of-living increase." The two suits were consolidated before a
three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of Columbia.
In a per curiam opinion widely believed to have been principally
authored by then-Judge, now-Justice, Antonin Scalia, the District Court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings violated
the "delegation doctrine."14 The Court held the statute unconstitutional
on the alternative ground that it violated the separation of powers doc-
trine; by retaining the power to remove the Comptroller General, Con-
gress had created a "here-and-now subservience" of the Comptroller Gen-
eral to Congress that was inconsistent with his exercise of executive
create a procedural framework to regulate future conflicts between the branches of government. See
Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial
Model, 43 U. CO. L. REv. 463, 482 (1976).
11. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982). Other examples of framework statutes include the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. and 701 et seq. (1982), and the Congressional Budget
Reduction and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 631-642 (1982).
12. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1378 (D.D.C. 1986) (Scalia, Gasch, Johnson,
JJ.). Morrison also brought the successful challenge to the legislative veto, Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) [hereinafter Chadha]. It is ironic that in both cases the
"public interest" movement joined forces with the conservative Reagan administration to attack statu-
tory innovations on separation of powers grounds.
The basis for Morrison's position in both cases was shaped by his analysis of the effect of the
statute on the power of organized interest groups. In Morrison's view, by increasing the influence of
members of Congress over administrative agencies, the legislative veto enhanced the influence of spe-
cial interest groups such as regulated industries. On the other hand, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
reduced the power of organized constituencies for social spending by transferring the decision to cut
social programs from high visibility votes in the Congress to the across-the-board, "automatic" cuts
pursuant to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Oral statement by A. Morrison, Hofstra University Sympo-
sium on the Supreme Court under the Leadership of Chief Justice Burger (Nov. 7, 1985).
13. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1378.
14. The conventional understanding of the delegation doctrine is that Congress must prescribe
standards to guide administrators in the exercise of delegated law-making powers. See Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring). In recent years, the doctrine has fallen into disuse and has been strongly criticized. See
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I J.L. EcoN. &
ORG. 81 (1985).
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powers.15 The Supreme Court granted expedited consideration of a direct
appeal 16 and affirmed.
A. The Supreme Court Opinions
According to then-Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion for himself
and four other justices, Section 251 of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings violated
the Constitution because
[b]y placing the responsibility for execution of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer who is
subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained con-
trol over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive
function."7
Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in
the judgment, but not in Chief Justice Burger's opinion. According to the
two concurring justices, Congress's retention of statutory authority to
remove the Comptroller General-a power which has never actually been
used' 6-did not, in and of itself, establish the "legislative" character of
that office. Instead, Justices Stevens and Marshall canvassed the Comp-
troller General's "existing statutory responsibilities"19 as well as "the his-
toric conception of the Comptroller General's office"'20 and determined
that the Comptroller General is an "agent" of Congress.2 Then, relying
on the legislative veto decision, INS v. Chadha,22 the concurring opinion
concluded that
[E]ven though it is well settled that Congress may delegate legislative
power to independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby
divest itself of a portion of its lawmaking power, when it elects to
exercise such power itself, it may not authorize a lesser representa-
tive of the Legislative Branch to act on its behalf.
... As we emphasized in Chadha, when Congress legislates,
when it makes binding policy, it must follow the procedures pre-
scribed in Article I. . . . through enactment by both Houses and
presentment to the President.2"
15. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1392.
16. 106 S. Ct. at 1181.
17. 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
18. Id. at 3195 (Stevens, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 3196-99.
20. Id. at 3197.
21. Id. at 3199.
22. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (one house veto struck down because Article 1 of Constitution requires
legislative action to be passed by majority of both Houses and presented to President).
23. 106 S. Ct. at 3205 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The rationale of the concurrence represents a potentially significant
expansion of Chadha, which most observers (including the present
author) read as permitting Congress to create institutions that exercise
lawmaking powers without following the procedures for bicameral enact-
ment and presentment to the President which the Constitution requires of
Congress itself.2 4 Under the reasoning of the Bowsher v. Synar concur-
rence, if another institution is deemed an "agent" of Congress, Chadha
applies.
Two justices dissented in Bowsher v. Synar. Justice White, as he had in
Chadha, condemned the majority's "distressingly formalistic view of sepa-
ration of powers."' 8 The bulk of Justice White's dissent was surprisingly
narrow, however, focusing on whether the particular office of the Comp-
troller General is independent, or under the control, of Congress. On the
more significant issue for separation of powers cases generally-whether
the concept of an "executive" function should be expanded to encompass
activities such as those performed by the Comptroller General under
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings-Justice White actually conceded that the
majority was correct:
I have no quarrel with the proposition that the powers exercised by
the Comptroller under the Act may be characterized as "executive"
in that they involve the interpretation and carrying out of the Act's
mandate. . . . I cannot accept, however, that the exercise of author-
ity by an officer removable for cause by joint resolution of Congress
is analogous to the impermissible execution of the law by Congress
itself, nor would I hold that the congressional role in the removal
process renders the Comptroller an "agent" of the Congress, incapa-
ble of receiving "executive" power.2
In Justice White's eyes, "The practical result of the removal provision is
not to render the Comptroller unduly dependent upon or subservient to
Congress, but to render him one of the most independent officers in the
entire federal establishment. '2 7
The second dissent, by Justice Blackmun, argued that, rather than
"striking down the central provisions of the Deficit Control Act," the
Court should have invalidated the "cumbersome, 65-year-old removal
24. Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution and the Legisla-
tive Veto, 1983 Sup. Ci. REv. 125, 159-60 (1984); see also Ginnane, The Control of Federal Admin-
istration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569, 595 (1953) (require-
ments of presentment and bicameral action do not apply to institutions other than Congress).
25. 106 S. Ct. at 3205 (White, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 3209 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied),
27. Id. at 3213 (White, J., dissenting).
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power that has never been exercised and appears to have been all but
forgotten until this litigation."28
B. The Issues the Court Overlooked
The Supreme Court overlooked several issues in Bowsher v. Synar.
First, the Court failed to pay sufficient attention to the Comptroller Gen-
eral's actual function under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Second, the Court
overlooked the important constitutional issue of whether the Comptroller
General can bind the President. Third, the Court failed to appreciate the
dangers of ruling on a challenge to the Comptroller General's role under
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings before the issue had "ripened" into a concrete
controversy which would clarify the actual relationship of various actors
under the statute.
1. Is the Comptroller General's Function "Executive"?
The primary point on which the various opinions joined issue is how
the relationship between the Comptroller General and Congress should be
characterized. If that had been the central issue which the Court should
have decided in Bowsher v. Synar (a point which this Article disputes),
then the concurrence probably had the best of the argument.
As the Court framed the issues, it was required to take on the difficult
task of predicting how the Comptroller General would have behaved in
the future: would the Comptroller General have been the lackey of Con-
gress (as the majority feared), or would he have exercised his duties with
the kind of independent professionalism that Justice White foresaw?
Unfortunately, this is the wrong question for the Court to have asked in
Bowsher v. Synar, and no good answers are yet possible. In advance of
actual experience under the statutory scheme, it is extremely difficult to
predict whether the Comptroller General would actually have been sub-
ject to the "here-and-now subservience to another branch" that the Court
feared.2'9
Courts are not well-suited for predicting how government officials will
behave in the future.80 Armed only with traditional legal tools, a court
cannot possibly foresee the many factors that may influence the way an
28. Id. at 3315 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
29. 106 S. Ct. at 3189 n.5 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1392 (D.D.C.
1986)).
30. Cf Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 562, 570 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (urging
rejection of "clear and present danger test" in context of subversive organizations, because Court
would have to "appraise imponderables, including international and national phenomena which baffle
the best informed foreign offices and . . . most experienced politicians. . . . No doctrine can be sound
whose application requires us to make a prophecy of that sort in the guise of a legal decision.").
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official will discharge his duties. The court can, of course, analyze the
formal legal structure within which the official functions-the wording of
the statutory mandate, the terms of the provisions for removing the offi-
cial, and so on. But this kind of formal statutory analysis frequently mis-
leads for the simple reason that the formal legal structure comprises only
a small, and often an insignificant, part of the total system of incentives
that may influence a government official's behavior.
Then-Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority in Bowsher v.
Synar is a classic example of this pitfall. Burger attempted to predict how
subservient the Comptroller General would be in exercising his authority
under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings by focusing exclusively on the existence
of Congress's statutory power to remove the Comptroller General for per-
manent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or felony,3 1 a
power that has never actually been invoked. 2 Perhaps Burger was correct
that the threat of removal for inefficiency would hang like the sword of
Damocles over the head of the Comptroller General, biasing his every
.action. But perhaps that is really not the case at all. Perhaps the real
political and institutional situation is that, as a practical matter, the
Comptroller General could not possibly be removed merely because cer-
tain members of Congress disagreed with his actions on a particular issue.
The important point is not which of these two scenarios is more realis-
tic, but that courts are not in a position to distinguish between the two.
The Comptroller General may enjoy great independence and freedom of
action in practice, whatever the wording of the terms of the removal stat-
ute. From the naked words of the statute defining the legal grounds for
removal, a court will find it impossible to surmise correctly whether the
threat of removal has a substantial effect on an office-holder's
performance."3
Recognizing these flaws in the majority's approach, Justice Stevens's
concurrence sought to broaden the frame of reference to take into account
other factors, such as the Comptroller General's other statutory responsi-
bilities and the "historic conception of the Comptroller General's office." 3
This is helpful, but only to a degree. Undoubtedly, the factors the concur-
rence considered are part of the overall system of incentives that affects an
incumbent's exercise of his powers. Ultimately, however, -the concurrence's
approach is only marginally better than the majority's, since it too is able
31. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B) (1982).
32. See supra text accompanying note 18.
33. Perhaps because they have life tenure themselves, Article III judges may tend to exaggerate
the importance of statutes defining the terms of removal.
34. 106 S. Ct. at 3197 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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to grasp only a small fraction of the totality of factors that may affect how
office-holders actually perform their functions.
Judges simply are not very good political scientists when it comes to
predicting the future behavior of government officials. Indeed, even the
best political scientists are not very good at predicting the future behavior
of officials; the game is simply too complicated. This is one reason why
courts should-and generally do-wait until issues are actually presented
in the factual setting of a concrete case, rather than let themselves be
drawn into speculating about future events."6
In the final analysis, a court simply has no business trying to use tradi-
tional legal materials to predict how an officer will function in the future
(unless it absolutely cannot avoid doing so, a circumstance that I cannot
presently imagine). None of the opinions in Bowsher v. Synar succeeds in
developing a convincing basis for guessing how "subservient" to Congress
the Comptroller General would have been in exercising his functions
under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
Moreover, the Court's unproductive debate about whether to character-
ize the Comptroller General as "legislative," "independent," or an
"agent" of Congress caused it to lose sight of a far more important issue:
the nature of the Comptroller General's actual functions under Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, The majority's so-called analysis of why the Comp-
troller General's role under the statute should be deemed executive (which
even Justice White does not dispute) was almost laughable in its
simplicity:
Appellants suggest that the duties assigned to the Comptroller Gen-
eral in the Act are essentially ministerial and mechanical so that
their performance does not constitute "execution of the law" in a
meaningful sense. On the contrary, we view these functions as
plainly entailing execution of the law in constitutional terms. Inter-
preting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative man-
date is the very essence of "execution" of the law. Under Sec. 251,
the Comptroller General must exercise judgment concerning facts
that affect the application of the Act. He must also interpret the
provisions of the Act to determine precisely what budgetary
35. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947) (federal employees' suit
against Civil Service Commission to prohibit Hatch Act enforcement presented no case or controversy
since it asked court to speculate on future political activity employees might engage in); A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANCEROUS BRANCH 146-47 (1962) (summarizing reasons courts should decide legal
issues only in context of actual, concrete controversies); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)
(no case or controversy presented by civil rights claim based on what policeman employed by respon-
dents might do in future); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (no case or controversy presented
by civil rights claim based on speculation that named plaintiff in class action might be charged with
crime and subjected to discriminatory practices).
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calculations are required. Decisions of that kind are typically made
by officers charged with executing a statute."
The Court certainly is correct that the Comptroller General's functions
would not be "ministerial" or "mechanical" in some cases that might be
imagined as arising under the Act,8 but as a matter of simple logic, that
fact does not imply that the Comptroller General's functions are necessa-
rily "executive." Many "executive" functions are "ministerial"; others are
not. One thing says very little about the other.
The Court mentioned only two other factors in determining that the
Comptroller General's functions are executive: (1) that the Comptroller
General must interpret the law; and (2) that he must exercise judgment
concerning relevant facts. Coming from anyone other than the Supreme
Court, this analysis would instantly be seen as shallow and unproductive.
One would have thought that interpreting law and applying it to facts
was the essence of a judicial, not an executive function. The primary point
is not that the Court errs in considering the Comptroller General's tasks
under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings executive, rather than judicial. (It is
worth noting in passing, however, that the Comptroller General's actual
functions under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings probably are more judicial
than executive, 8 and that if these functions were analyzed under prece-
dents concerning Article I "legislative courts," the Comptroller General's
role under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings might well be found constitu-
tional.89) The more important point, for the moment, is that the test for
36. 106 S. Ct. at 3192 (emphasis supplied).
37. The degree of discretion the Comptroller General exercises in making his report will vary
from instance to instance. His role is essentially that of an arbitrator who is called upon to resolve the
differences between the initial estimates of the deficit submitted by the Office of Management and
Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. Depending upon the nature of the particular disagree-
ments of fact or statutory interpretation, if any, which are raised in a particular instance, the Comp-
troller General's duties may be highly discretionary, or relatively simple and straightforward. In the
one instance in which the Comptroller General actually made a report which formed the basis for
sequestrations by the President, the issues were relatively clear and straightforward. See 51 Fed. Reg.
4291 (Feb. 4, 1986). The fact that the nature of the Comptroller General's task may vary from
instance to instance provides another reason that the Court should wait for a concrete case before
ruling on the constitutional issue.
38. The Comptroller General is charged with preparing a report which resolves the differences
between deficit estimates made by the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and
Budget. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings § 251(b)(1), 2 U.S.C.A. § 901(b)(1) (West Supp. 1986). The
Comptroller General's report does not actually do anything in and of itself, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 51-52. Instead it establishes the "law" that the President is duty bound to follow in seques-
tering funds.
It is the essence of the judicial function to resolve disputed issues of law and fact, thereby establish-
ing an authoritative standard which the Executive is duty bound to follow in executing the laws.
39. A long line of cases has recognized the power of Congress to assign judicial functions in
certain areas to specialized tribunals created under Article I, rather than to Article III courts. See,
e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977)
(assignment to administrative agency task of adjudicating violations of Occupational Safety & Health
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determining "executive" functions announced by the Court in Bowsher v.
Synar is utterly vapid and without content.
In a government of laws, by definition, every employee of the govern-
ment must "interpret" laws and "exercise judgment concerning facts" to
apply the law to specific situations. The Supreme Court itself, in reaching
its decision in Bowsher v. Synar, satisfies the test it announces there for
performing an "executive function," since it too must "interpret law" and
"exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act."
Indeed, the obligation to interpret law and apply it to facts is not limited
to governmental officials; every citizen must "interpret" law and "deter-
mine facts" in order to conform his or her conduct to the dictates of the
law.
The Court's approach is flawed not simply because the particular defi-
nition of "executive" action that it proposes is shallow and unhelpful. A
more fundamental jurisprudential error underlies the Court's whole phi-
losophy of trying to decide separation of powers issues by developing defi-
nitions of concepts such as "executive" action. The Court's attempt to
develop a jurisprudence of conceptual definitions in separation of powers
cases necessarily proceeds from the premise that concepts like "executive"
action are sufficiently coherent and powerful that by defining these con-
cepts, issues such as whether the officer performing certain functions must
be subject to presidential control can be resolved. However, this premise is
dubious for two independent reasons: first, it simply may not be possible
to devise a comprehensive, rigorous, analytic definition of "executive"
action, and secondly, ever if it were possible, the definition probably
would not have sufficient power to resolve the variety of subtle separation
of powers issues that arise.
The majority opinion in Bowsher v. Synar apparently assumes as self-
evident that because the term "executive Power" is used in the Constitu-
tion, one must be able to define it. But the fact that the Constitution uses
a concept such as the "executive Power" does not imply that these words
are necessarily susceptible of a sharp-edged analytic definition. On the
contrary, many of the Constitution's "broad and majestic concepts" do not
Act constitutional). Article I tribunals may adjudicate certain kinds of "public rights." Northern Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982) (recognizing public-rights doc-
trine as based on distinction between matters that could be conclusively determined by the executive
and legislative branches and matters that are 'inherently . . . judical' (citations omitted) but holding
that bankruptcy courts do not fall within that exception); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)
(upholding fact finding by deputy commissioner under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act; cataloging some of the matters that fall within public-rights doctrine: "interstate and
foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the Post
Office, pensions and payments to veterans"). While the rationale for and scope of the public-rights
exception is less than crystal clear, it seems likely that the function performed by the Comptroller
General under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings would fall within it.
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have precise, fixed definitions, but were "purposely left to gather meaning
from experience. '"40
"Executive" action probably should be thought of as an evolving con-
cept, like "due process," "property," or "privacy," for which no fixed,
comprehensive analytic definition is possible. When the Framers of the
Constitution vested the "executive Power" in the President, they undoubt-
edly had a general idea in mind, probably something like "those mana-
gerial functions of government which are not legislative (law creating) or
judicial (rights defining) in nature." But it simply does not follow that
because the Constitution uses a term like the "executive Power" that the
term must have a fixed, definitive meaning that will resolve all controver-
sies concerning what is included and what is excluded. On the contrary, it
seems much more likely that the Framers intended to leave it to subse-
quent political history to work out the details of which functions were to
be performed by the executive, as opposed to the legislative and judicial
branches.4 '
Consider the example of issuing detailed rules to regulate the economy.
Today this is regarded as an "executive" function.42 But it is not produc-
tive to think that rulemaking "is" (and always was) executive because it
came within the one true and correct definition of "executive" that the
Framers had in mind. Rather, we should recognize that rulemaking has
become an executive function because, as the three branches evolved, the
rulemaking function fit with the characteristics that the executive branch
had developed and it was not inconsistent with the roles of the other
branches for the executive to perform this function.
The Court in Bowsher v. Synar probably took on an impossible task
when it set out to write a simple, comprehensive, and yet definitive defini-
tion of executive action. But even if it were possible to define "executive"
action, it would not follow that applying definitions of concepts would be
the best way to decide separation of powers cases.4 The constitutional
theory of separation of powers is by its nature holistic; it draws its mean-
ing from the totality of the structures created by the Constitution and the
history of how our institutions have evolved. No simple definition, no mat-
ter how well-crafted, can encapsulate all the wisdom implicit in the struc-
ture of the Constitution and our political history. By resorting to a
40. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
41. See generally Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985) (framers of Constitution did not intend their understanding of terms to bind later
generations).
42. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
43. Cf Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1429-30 (1974) (definition of
"privacy" is not helpful for deciding cases which balance individual's interest in autonomy against
community's conception of public good).
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jurisprudence of definitions, the Court inevitably oversimplifies the issues
in separation of powers cases.
While a complete definition of the "executive" function is probably
impossible, enough can be said about some of the characteristics that are
necessary (but not sufficient) to establish that a function is inherently
executive to demonstrate that the Comptroller General's functions under
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings should not fall into that category. The Court's
proposed test for determining whether an action is executive focuses on
whether an official must interpret law and determine facts in the course of
his duties." This asks the wrong questions. When determining whether a
governmental action is so inherently executive in nature that it cannot
constitutionally be assigned to an official outside the executive branch, the
primary focus should not be on the process that leads up to the action, but
rather on the effect of the action taken. 45 To "execute" the laws is to "put
[them] into effect: to carry [them] out fully and completely.""' To qualify
as activity that is inherently executive in nature, at a minimum something
must be the final, completed act of the government.
Consider a traditionally executive function, such as prosecuting
crimes."7 The actions of a prosecutor are "executive," not because in the
course of her duties a prosecutor interprets law and applies it to facts
(although she may); but rather because the prosecutor acts as and for the
United States in carrying out a managerial function of government-law
enforcement-that has traditionally been performed by the executive
branch." The prosecutor's actions are the completed actions of the United
States as a whole, not me-'ely the act of a component part that precedes
action by the United States. 9
44. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
45. Cf Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952 (action is legislative because it has effect of "altering legal
rights").
46. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 794 (1981); see also BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 509 (5th ed. 1979): "Execute. To complete; ...to perform; to do ...."
47. The acknowledgment in the text that prosecuting crimes has traditionally been regarded as an
executive function is not intended to imply that statutes creating "independent special counsels" are
unconstitutional.
48. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (Congress is not "law enforcement or
trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of the government.").
49. Until recently, the Supreme Court wisely refrained from attempting to define an "executive"
function. Some support for the approach advocated in the text can be found, however, in the dissent
by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Springer involved the voting of stock in certain corporations set up by the
government of the Philippine Islands, then a U.S. territory. In a superficial opinion, the majority held
that to vote stock was inherently executive in nature, and therefore that this action could not be
performed by members of the legislative branch. The dissent, by Holmes and Brandeis, probes far
deeper into the logic of separation of powers considerations under our Constitution. Holmes and
Brandeis would not have held that voting the stock was an executive function for the reason that the
"corporation[si did not perform functions of the Government." 277 U.S. at 211. This supports the
view advocated in the text that actions are executive only if they are final actions taken by and for the
United States.
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It must be stressed that not every completed action by the United States
is therefore "executive." In a sense, a decision by the Supreme Court, or a
vote by the Congress to override a veto, represents completed action by the
United States. The point is the converse: unless an action is the completed
action of the United States, it cannot qualify as so inherently an executive
function that it cannot be performed by any other branch of government.
Unfortunately, the Bowsher v. Synar Court did not grasp this point,
and, as a result, its test for determining when actions are "executive" per-
petuates a fundamental misunderstanding of what constitutes an exercise
of executive power under the Constitution. The Constitution does man-
date that the President "shall take care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted,' 50 but this phrase does not purport to be a definition of the execu-
tive function. The fact that the President has an explicit obligation to
execute the laws faithfully cannot mean that every time another govern-
ment official faithfully "executes" a law, in the sense of obeying its com-
mands in the course of his or her governmental duties, that official thereby
becomes involved in an exercise of exclusively "executive" powers. For
example, a district court judge is duty-bound to follow the dictates of the
law in ruling on a case arising from the Freedom of Information Act, and
in this sense, the judge must "execute" the law's commands. But the fact
that a judge acts pursuant to the command of law (and, therefore, must
interpret law and apply it to facts) does not convert the judicial enterprise
into an executive one. A governmental action is "executive" because of the
nature of its effect, not because it is in obedience to the command of law.
2. The Comptroller General and the President
In assessing whether the Comptroller General's functions under
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings are functions which the Constitution requires
be performed only by an officer subject to presidential removal, the
Supreme Court should have paid closer attention to the actual provisions
of the statute. Under Section 251(b) of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the
Comptroller General is charged to prepare a report to the President and
Congress outlining his interpretation of the budget cuts required to meet
the maximum deficit targets of the statute.5 ' Significantly, however, the
Comptroller General's report does not, in and of itself, actually sequester
appropriated funds. It is not the completed act of the United States. On
the contrary, the statute specifically provides that a further step-action
50. U.S. CoNs'r. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. A separate clause of the Constitution vests "the executive
Power" in the President. U.S. CONs". art. I, § 1, cl. I.
51. 2 U.S.C.A. § 901(b) (West Supp. 1986).
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by the President-is necessary to carry into effect the sequestration of
funds mandated by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 52 Thus, the Comptroller
General's report would not have "put completely into effect" the statute's
command that the deficit not exceed the specified maximum. If the Court
had applied the proper test, as outlined above, the Comptroller General's
making a report (which is preliminary to final action by the United
States) should not have been regarded as performing a function which the
Constitution requires be performed only by an officer subject to presiden-
tial removal. The Comptroller General's report is, to be sure, made pur-
suant to the command of law (and in this sense, carries out the laws), but
it does not actually execute the law in the sense of putting it into final
effect. That is left to the President.
Admittedly, Section 252 of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings purports to bind
the President to carry out, without modification, the determinations in the
Comptroller General's report.68 But this provision itself is open to serious
constitutional challenge. After all, the Constitution vests "[tihe executive
Power . . .in a President of the United States."" 4 It is doubtful whether
a statute may constitutionally require the President to perform an execu-
tive act (the final sequestrations) at the behest of another, inferior official,
since that would divest the President of a portion of the executive power
vested in him by the Constitution. Indeed, in signing Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, President Reagan specifically expressed similar doubts about the
authority of the Comptroller General to bind the President. 5
Kendall v. United States6 is the Supreme Court decision that comes
closest to answering the question of whether a statute is constitutional if it
purports to bind the President to perform an executive action at the behest
of an inferior official. The facts of Kendall are complicated6" and the
52. 2 U.S.C.A. § 902 (West Supp. 1986).
53. 2 U.S.C.A. § 902(a)(3) (West Supp. 1986) ("The [President's] order must ...incorporate
the provisions of the report submitted [by the Comptroller General] under section 901(b) of this title,
and must be consistent with such report in all respects. The President may not modify or recalculate
any of the estimates, determinations, specifications, bases, amounts or percentages set forth in the
IComptroller General's] report ....").
54. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
55. Similar constitutional concerns are raised by a provision in the bill authorizing the Presi-
dent to terminate or modify defense contracts for deficit reduction purposes, but only if the
action is approved by the Comptroller General. Under our constitutional system, an agent of
the Congress may not exercise such supervisory authority over the President.
President's Statement on Signing H.J. Res. 372 Into Law, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1490,
1491 (Dec. 12, 1985).
56. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
57. Kendall was a mandamus action against the Postmaster General to require payment of funds
due under certain postal contracts. The outgoing Postmaster General had determined that the funds
were properly due. His successor sought to reopen the matter and asserted certain adjustments against
the claimants. At that point, Congress intervened, passing a special statute that directed another
executive official, the Solicitor of the Treasury, to determine the amounts properly due to the claim-
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holding is ambiguous, but on at least one construction, the President in
some circumstances can be compelled to obey the findings of an inferior
official in the Executive branch.5 8 At the same time, however, in dicta the
Kendall Court indicated that certain "political duties" must remain sub-
ject to presidential supervision and control. 9 A fair reading of Kendall
leaves unsettled the important constitutional questions of whether the
President may be bound to follow orders from an inferior official, and if
so under what circumstances.60 But even if one were to read Kendall as
definitively resolving that issue for officials within the executive branch,
Section 252 of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings presented a potentially distin-
guishable constitutional issue, since the Comptroller General probably
cannot be considered part of the executive branch.
ants. The Solicitor of the Treasury found for the claimants, but the Postmaster General still refused to
pay the disputed amounts, claiming that he was "alone subject to the direction and control of the
President." 37 U.S, at 612. Thus, the case could be viewed as presenting the issue whether the deci-
sion of an inferior official, the Solicitor of the Treasury, acting pursuant to statute could bind the
President and the Postmaster General.
58. The Supreme Court held that a mandamus should issue to compel the Postmaster General to
pay the disputed sums, and observed more broadly that "Itlo contend that the obligation imposed on
the president to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel
construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible." 37 U.S. at 613. However, the Court was
careful to emphasize that it did not view the case as one in which "any such power has been claimed
by the President"; rather, the Court maintained, the President had not forbidden the Postmaster Gen-
eral to pay the disputed sums; he had merely submitted a message to Congress urging further consid-
eration of the issue. Id. at 613.
59. In dicta, the Kendall Court proposed the following general framework concerning the Presi-
dent's power to supervise the actions of other executive branch officials:
The executive power is vested in a President; and so far as his powers are derived from the
constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by
the constitution through the impeaching power. But it by no means follows, that every officer
in every branch of that department is under the exclusive direction of the President. Such a
principle, we apprehend, is not, and certainly cannot be claimed by the President.
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department,
the discharge of which is under the direction of the President. But it would be an alarming
doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think
proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; and in
such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law,
and not to the direction of the president. And this is emphatically the case, where the duty
enjoined is of a mere ministerial character.
Id. at 610 (emphasis supplied).
The key word for understanding the narrow holding in Kendall is probably "exclusive." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), had already held that officers of the executive branch were
not subject to the "exclusive direction" of the President, but subject to judicial control as well. But at
the same time that the Kendall Court reasserted the power to use mandamus to compel executive
branch officials to perform nondiscretionary, "ministerial" duties imposed on them by law, it also
recognized that there is an ambit of "certain political duties" within which executive branch officials
are subject to presidential direction and control. 37 U.S. at 610. The Kendall Court left open how
broadly or narrowly these respective spheres are to be defined.
60. For a recent discussion of these issues, see Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 607 (1984). See generally
Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757 (1979)
(conventional theories of President's authority to execute laws inadequate to explain current practice).
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Thus, the key unsettled issue of constitutional law underlying Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings was not in fact raised by Section 251, which merely
directs the Comptroller General to prepare a report to the President and
Congress; it was instead raised by Section 252, which requires the Presi-
dent to follow that report when making his own sequestrations. Only by
implicitly deciding the constitutional issue that the President is indeed
bound to follow the Comptroller General's report was the Court in Bow-
sher v. Synar able to convert that report, which was intended to form the
basis for later executive action by the President, into executive action
itself. Indeed, the Court assumed that the President's action in sequester-
ing funds in response to the Comptroller General's report was a non-
discretionary, ministerial act." This reading of the statute is both unwise
and dubious as a matter of constitutional law.
3. Ripeness
Rather than being drawn into premature speculation about how the
Comptroller General would exercise his duties under Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, and whether his report would bind the President if at some
future time the President disagreed with his interpretation of the statute's
requirements, the Court should have invoked the ripeness doctrine to
avoid ruling on those issues at this time.6 The Court should have held
simply that the Comptroller General's report was not final executive ac-
tion because it did not actually sequester funds, and then put off deciding
whether the President is bound to follow the Comptroller General's report
in making sequestrations of funds until an actual case or controversy
61. 106 S. Ct. at 3192 ("The executive nature of the Comptroller General's functions under the
Act is revealed in § 252(a)(3), which gives the Comptroller General the ultimate authority to deter-
mine the budget cuts to be made. Indeed, the Comptroller General commands the President to carry
out, without the slightest variation . . . the directive of the Comptroller General as to the budget
reductions. ... ); id. at 3203 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It is the Comptroller General's Report that
the President must follow and that will have conclusive effect.").
62. In a footnote, the Bowsher v. Synar majority rejected the argument that "the effect of a re-
moval provision is not 'ripe' until that provision is actually used." Id. at 3189 n.5. Following the
District Court, the majority held that the challenge to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was "ripe" because
"'it is the Comptroller General's presumed desire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress, which
creates the here-and-now subservience to another branch .... ' " Id. at 3189 n.5 (quoting Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1392 (D.D.C. 1986)) (emphasis supplied). However, "presuming"
a here-and-now subservience from the existence of a never-used statutory removal provision is not a
responsible way for the Court to perform its function in a sensitive constitutional case if by invoking
the ripeness doctrine the Court could have ensured that it would later be in a better position to decide
whether the feared subservience had actually materialized.
Moreover, even if the subservience issue could have been considered ripe, the issue of whether the
President would be bound to follow the Comptroller General's report clearly was not. The Court's
conclusion that the Comptroller General would be performing an "executive" function depended on
its assumption that the President would be bound to follow the Comptroller General's report.
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properly raised that issue." If the President does indeed have
constitutional power to refuse to follow the Comptroller General's recom-
mendations, then the challenge to Section 251 of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings clearly would not be ripe for judicial decision until the President
acted.
A case illustrating the principle that a recommendation requiring the
President's approval before going into effect does not yet present a case or
controversy for judicial review is Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman Steamship Corp." That case involved a section of the Civil
Aeronautics Act that made orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
granting certificates to engage in overseas or foreign air transportation
subject to approval by the President."' The Supreme Court held that the
provision requiring presidential approval rendered the CAB's order a
mere "recommendation," 6 which was not subject to judicial review:
Until the decision of the Board has Presidential approval, it grants
no privilege and denies no right. . . . To revise or review an admin-
istrative decision which has only the force of a recommendation to
the President would be to render an advisory opinion in its most
obnoxious form . . .
As in Waterman Steamship, if the Comptroller General's report under
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings must be adopted by the President before it
actually denies rights,"' then the report should not be regarded as final
executive action. Rather, the report is a mere recommendation to the Pres-
ident which is not effective unless and until the President adopts it as the
63. It is important to distinguish between ripeness as it affects a case as a whole and ripeness as it
affects a particular issue within the case. Here the National Treasury Union Employees claimed that
its members had been denied a pay raise by certain provisions of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 106 S.
Ct. at 3185. This certainly presents an actual "case or controversy." But the Union should be limited
to challenging those aspects of the statute as applied that have actually affected it. See supra note 35.
The fact that a case is ripe for adjudication does not mean that every issue that might conceivably
be raised is also ripe for resolution. The Supreme Court goes astray by assuming that the President
would be bound to follow the Comptroller General's report even if the President disagreed with it.
That, however, is an entirely hypothetical controversy that has not yet arisen.
64. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
65. Civil Aeronautics Act § 601, ch. 601, title VIII, § 801, 52 Stat. 1014 (1938), repealed by Act
of Aug. 23, 1958, tit. XIV, § 1401(b), 72 Stat. 806 (current version at 49 U.S.C.A § 1461 (West
Supp. 1986)).
66. 333 U.S. at 109.
67. Id. at 112-13.
68. The members of the National Treasury Employees Union were not denied their scheduled
cost-of-living raise as a result of any action taken by the Comptroller General under Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, but rather because of a sequestration order issued by the President. Thus, while
the Union presented a live "case or controversy," it did not fairly encompass the issue of whether the
President would be bound to follow the Comptroller General's report if he disagreed with it. See
supra note 38.
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basis for his final executive action. To be sure, the statute at issue in
Waterman Steamship was clear on its face that the CAB's order was
effective only if the President approved it, while in Bowsher v. Synar the
statute purports to require the President to follow the Comptroller
General's recommendations for sequestrations."' But for present purposes,
the point is not so much that the President has clear legal authority to
decline to follow the Comptroller General's report as it is that the Presi-
dent's authority one way or the other is not clear, although the Court
proceeded as if it were.
The Court in Bowsher v. Synar could not have legitimately decided that
the Comptroller General's report was executive action unless it first
decided that the President had no authority to refuse to follow it. The
Court should not have decided that important constitutional issue in the
absence of a case or controversy in which the President actually asserted
the authority to disregard or modify the Comptroller General's recom-
mendations (not to mention in the absence of briefing by the parties and
reasoned discussion in the opinion).
The Court in Bowsher v. Synar should have held that the challenge to
the Comptroller General's role was not yet ripe for review until a situa-
tion actually arose in which the Comptroller General reported recommen-
dations for sequestrations that the President was not inclined to accept.
Depending on how the Comptroller General exercised his authority, such
a situation might never have arisen.70 If the Comptroller General had
acted with the kind of independent professionalism envisioned by Justice
White's dissent, future Presidents might never have chosen to join issue
with the Comptroller General's interpretation of what Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings required; on the other hand, if the Comptroller General's actions
in practice had borne out the majority's fear that the Comptroller General
would act as the partisan lackey of the legislative branch, then the Court
could have addressed the important constitutional issue of whether the
Comptroller General's report may bind the President in the context of a
concrete case. The experience gained in the interim would have been
invaluable to the Court in assessing whether the Comptroller General was
performing his functions under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings objectively and
69. See supra note 53.
70. The Supreme Court has suggested that "inevitability" may justify the rejection of an argu-
ment that a issue is unripe. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the court rejected the contention
that a separation of powers challenge to the composition of the Federal Election Commission was not
yet ripe by emphasizing the "inevitability" that complainants would be subjected to disputed aspects
of the Commission's powers. Id. at 114. There was no such "inevitability" justifying a rejection of the
ripeness argument in Bowsher v. Synar. On the contrary, it is quite plausible that an actual disagree-
ment between the President and the Comptroller General over how to apply the statutory formula to
reduce the deficit might never have arisen.
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independently, or as a partisan for Congress. Had the Court waited to
rule on the Comptroller General's role until a ripe controversey was
presented, it would have had available much better information based on
the Comptroller General's "track record" in the meantime.
To summarize, the kinds of legislative and historical materials relied on
by all the opinions in Bowsher v. Synar to assess the character of the
Comptroller General's office in the abstract are an extremely unreliable
basis on which to predict how the complex institutional arrangements cre-
ated by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings would have worked in practice. The
Court would have been much wiser to hold that these aspects of the case
were not ripe until a concrete case arose in which the President actually
disputed the Comptroller General's report. At that point, the Court would
have been in a better position to determine, in the light of actual experi-
ence under the statute, whether the Comptroller General's connections
with the legislative branch really were inconsistent with the role he was
assigned to play by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
There is a second, independent consideration suggesting that a chal-
lenge to the Comptroller General's role under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
was not yet ripe. There are strong reasons to believe that the automatic
sequestration procedures of sections 251 and 252 of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings were not actually intended to be executed by either the Comp-
troller General or the President in order to reduce the deficit. Rather,
their purpose was to create the threat of an automatic mechanism so
unpalatable to all concerned that Congress and the President would be
forced to agree on an alternative to avoid the across-the-board sequestra-
tions." If Gramm-Rudman-Hollings had worked as intended, the stage of
automatic sequestration by the President would have rarely, if ever, been
reached. Consequently, if the Court had held that the challenge to the
Comptroller General's role under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was not ripe
until an actual controversy arose between the Comptroller General and
the President, the Court might well have been able to avoid unnecessarily
(not to mention wrongly) deciding the constitutional issues."
A close reading of the statute reveals that Congress hoped the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings process would never reach the final stage of automatic,
across-the-board sequestrations. Section 251(c) provides, for example, that
after the Comptroller General's initial report of the program-by-program
budget reductions needed to reach the deficit targets, a revised report shall
71. See Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HAS-
TINGS CoNs'r. L.Q. 185, 187, 189 & n.19 (1986).
72. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Supreme Court
should avoid deciding constitutional issues if case can be resolved on other grounds).
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be prepared "indicating whether and to what extent, as a result of laws
enacted . . .after the . . . initial report .. . the excess deficit . . .has
been eliminated, reduced or increased.""3 Clearly, Congress expected that
future Congresses and Presidents would view the cuts threatened in the
Comptroller General's initial report as unacceptable and then react by
passing a revised budget that would eliminate the need for sequestrations.
It seems quite plausible, then, that far from constituting final executive
action, the Comptroller General's report to the President and Congress
concerning the specific consequences of further inaction on the deficit was
actually intended to focus public attention and rally political support for
further legislative action that would avoid the draconian, across-the-board
budget cuts.
Whatever else might be considered a function that the Constitution con-
fides exclusively to the executive branch, making a public report that
focuses political pressure on Congress and the Administration to deal with
the deficit is surely not in that category. 4 Whether in practice the Comp-
troller General's report would have become tantamount to executive action
to sequester funds (as the Court assumes), or whether the report would
have merely aided the legislative function by focusing public attention and
forcing action by the political branches, cannot be determined from the
cold words of the statute in advance of any experience under it. The
Court should have permitted the process created by Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings to go forward by holding that the challenge to the Comptroller
General's role was not yet "ripe."
II. The Consequences of Bowsher v. Synar
Bowsher v. Synar is now history, and debates about what the Court
should have done have become the province of academic articles. The
more important issue, now that the Court has rendered its decision, is
what effect Bowsher v. Synar will have in the future.
Professor Frederick Schauer has pointed out that Supreme Court opin-
ions have effects both "horizontally"-how they affect decisions by
Supreme Court decisions in other areas-and "vertically" -how they af-
fect other institutions in the immediate area at issue. 5 The Bowsher v.
Synar decision has important effects both horizontally and vertically. This
Part will first evaluate the horizontal effect of Bowsher v. Synar on the
73. 2 U.S.C.A. § 901(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1986).
74. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 131 (officers of legislative branch may engage in activities
"essentially of an investigative and informative nature" in aid of Congress's legislative functions);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (accord); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 132 (1959) (public exposure is permissible purpose of legislative committee investigation).
75. Schauer, Opinions as Rules (Book Review), 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 682 (1986).
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Supreme Court's evolving separation of powers jurisprudence. It con-
cludes that while the opinion's implications might have been even worse,
Bowsher v. Synar presents a side of the current Supreme Court that is
simplistic, inflexible, and extremely insensitive to the needs of modern
government.
The vertical effect of Bowsher v. Synar on efforts to develop legal
mechanisms for deficit control will be considered next. The thesis of this
section is that Bowsher v. Synar was far more damaging to Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings than may have appeared. As a result of the Court's
untimely intervention, there is virtually no chance that Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings will succeed in bringing the deficit under control.
A. Bowsher v. Synar and Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
A curious ambivalence-even schizophrenia-has characterized the
Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence in recent years. Two
seemingly inconsistent lines of authority have grown and prospered, evi-
dently untroubled by one another's existence.
On one hand, there are decisions like the Iranian hostage agreement
case, Dames & Moore v. Regan,"' or the Watergate tapes case, Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services.7 This line of decisions is character-
ized by a flexible and deferential approach to new institutions which my
colleague, Stephen L. Carter, has christened the "evolutionary tradition"
in separation of powers cases.78 More recent examples of this line of cases
are Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor79 and Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,8" in which the Court pulled
back from its insistence in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co.8 that only Article III courts could constitutionally
resolve traditional, private disputes.
76. 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (President authorized by International Emergency Economic Powers Act
to nullify attachments of assets and had power to suspend and terminate claims of American nationals
against Iran).
77. 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (regulation of disposition of presidential materials not violation of sepa-
ration of powers doctrine).
78. S. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the
Separation of Powers 1 (Jan. 1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (forthcoming in
B.Y.U. L. REv. (1987)).
79. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986) (agency's assumption of jurisdiction over common-law counterclaims
does not violate Article 111).
80. 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985) (arbitration provisions of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982), do not violate Article 111).
81. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), unconstitutionally con-
ferred Article III judicial powers on bankruptcy judges who at time lacked Article III protections such
as lifetime tenure).
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At the same time, however, a parallel line of Supreme Court decisions
has also developed that Professor Carter calls the "de-evolutionary
tradition." '82 These cases typically contain a more literal and absolutist
construction of the Constitution and a rhetorical desire to return to the
simpler world that the Framers allegedly had in mind when they wrote
the Constitution. Examples of the de-evolutionary line are Buckley v.
Valeo,83 striking down the composition of the Federal Election Commis-
sion, which had been set up in the wake of Watergate to police campaign
spending; INS v. Chadha,84 striking down the legislative veto over law-
making by executive and administrative bodies; and now, Bowsher v.
Synar, striking down Congress's attempt to deal with the deficit through
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
It is not altogether surprising that two seemingly irreconcilable lines of
cases would exist simultaneously in separation of powers jurisprudence. A
fundamental tension between opposing values underlies, indeed defines,
this area of law. One value is the perceived need to adapt governmental
institutions to deal with new challenges; the other is "constitutionalism,"
the idea that the wisdom embodied in our constitutional tradition should
constrain actions by current majorities.85 Where values conflict, law often
assumes a pattern of opposed pairs of cases, with the result in one case
marking the limit of the principle announced in the other."
What is bothersome about the developing jurisprudence in separation of
powers cases is not that the Court sometimes indulges the creation of new
institutions and on other occasions strikes them down. Rather, what is
bothersome is that the two lines of authority seem to be developing inde-
pendently, without the Court explaining why it permits some institutional
innovations that the Framers never contemplated while it strikes down
others.
While the glimmer of a theory to distinguish between the two lines of
cases may be emerging,87 the dualistic quality of the Supreme Court's
82. S. Carter, supra note 78, at 1.
83. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
84. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
85. See Elliott, supra note 24, at 125-26 (1984).
86. Compare, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (community may prohibit
more than two "unrelated persons" from living together as one household) with Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (community may not prohibit two cousins and their grandmother
from living together as one household by defining them as "unrelated persons").
87. The hint of a possible unifying theory emerges from Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986), which upheld the power of
the Commission to hear a state law counterclaim. In response to the charge that the Court's more
flexible interpretation of separation of powers principles was at war with the spirit of its recent
decision in Bowsher v. Synar, Justice O'Connor responded: "Unlike Bowsher, this case raises no
question of the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch." 106 S.
Ct. at 3261. This is an odd understanding of Bowsher v. Synar, since the true effect of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings was to restrain future Congresses. See Kahn, supra note 71, at 188-90. But leaving
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separation of powers decisions cautions against overemphasizing the im-
plications of any single decision. Bowsher v. Synar represents only part of
the story, a facet rather than the totality of the Court's views. Nonethe-
less, certain possible implications from Bowsher v. Synar do emerge for
other issues.
1. The Constitutional Status of "Independent" Agencies
The most celebrated issue raised in Bowsher v. Synar is one that the
Court explicitly declined to decide: the constitutional status of the "inde-
pendent" regulatory agencies. 88 In a footnote, then-Chief Justice Burger's
opinion for the majority specifically disavowed that the decision "cast[s]
doubt on the status of 'independent' agencies because no issues involving
such agencies are presented here."89
The concurrence by Justices Stevens and Marshall went further, assert-
ing that it is "well settled that Congress may delegate legislative power to
independent agencies . ... '90 Indeed, the concurrence's novel theory that
Chadha applies to "agents" of Congress"1 may be seen as an attempt to
create logical space between the Comptroller General, who may not be
given lawmaking powers because he is an agent of Congress, and "inde-
pendent" agencies, which may receive delegations of lawmaking authority
because they are not "agents," but something else. 92 (If this was indeed
one of the concurrence's purposes, the choice of the word "agent" may
prove to be unfortunate; it may be difficult to argue later that an "agency"
is not an "agent.")
Although it could have been worse-for example, if the Court had rein-
vigorated the dormant "delegation doctrine" to invalidate Gramm-
aside for the moment whether the Court correctly categorized the issue in Bowsher, Justice
O'Connor's statement does offer some promise for understanding when the Court invokes its tough
"de-evolutionary" approach as opposed to its more lenient "evolutionary" analysis. Recent cases such
as Chadha (and even Northern Pipeline) in which the Court struck down Congress's statutory cre-
ations can be understood as resistance of the Court against what it perceived (rightly or wrongly) as
an attempt by Congress to expand its own power.
88. The concept of an "independent" agency is poorly defined. It generally means one whose
members are protected from removal by the President except upon grounds prescribed by statute. See
generally Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding statute may constitu-
tionally limit President's power to remove FTC commissioner to specified "cause" and acknowledging
existence of independent agencies).
A possible reason that the Court did such a poor job of analyzing the Comptroller General's actual
functions under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, see supra text accompanying notes 36-50, is that the pri-
mary attention of the Justices was focused on the effect of their decision on the problem of the consti-
tutionality of independent agencies.
89. 106 S. Ct. at 3188 n.4.
90. 106 S. Ct. at 3205 (Stevens, J., concurring).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
92. But see 106 S. Ct. at 3215 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that concurrence's
"agency" theory may, but should not, cast doubt on status of independent agencies).
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Rudman-Hollings-no one should draw much comfort from the
majority's assurance that the status of the independent agencies was not
before the Court. The tenor of the Court's opinion, as well as its rationale
and mode of analysis, is anything but promising for the argument that
Congress has broad authority under the necessary and proper clause to
create a variety of governmental institutions such as independent
agencies.94
It is hard to believe that the Court would actually strike down such an
established feature of our legal universe as the independent agency.96 But
the inexorable logic of "de-evolutionary" separation of powers decisions
like Bowsher v. Synar seems headed in that direction. If all institutions of
government must be "in" one of the three branches, it is hard to imagine
the independent agencies "in" any branch other than the executive.9" It is
also hard to imagine what it means to be "in" the executive branch if an
institution is not subject to presidential supervision and control, and Bow-
sher v. Synar seems to equate the removal power with control.
But do not write off the independent agency too quickly just because
the logic of decisions like Bowsher v. Synar seems headed in that direc-
tion. There is more to law than logic, as Justice Holmes reminded us in
his famous aphorism. 9 And in recent years this Supreme Court has had a
high tolerance for logical contradiction when it comes to leaving prior
results in effect, while undermining their logical foundations in its current
decisions."
93. In a footnote, the Bowsher v. Synar majority stated that it had "no occasion for considering
appellees' other challenges ... including their argument that the assignment of powers to the Comp-
troller General . . . violates the delegation doctrine .... " 106 S. Ct. at 3193 n.10. The District
Court rejected the delegation doctrine argument. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1389
(D.D.C. 1986).
94. But see Steele & Bowman, The Constitutionality of Independent Regulatory Agencies Under
the Necessary and Proper Clause: The Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG.
363 (1987) (arguing for constitutionality of Federal Election Commission under necessary and proper
clause). The author of this Article is himself sympathetic to the argument that the necessary and
proper clause empowers Congress to create independent agencies. See Elliott, supra note 24, at 142-
43, 175.
For other discussions of the issue of independent agencies, see The Uneasy Status of the Adminis-
trative Agency, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 277 (1987); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41
(1986).
95. See Elliott, supra note 24, at 173 ("[Ilt is hard to imagine any proposition of constitutional
law more firmly established de facto than that law can be made by administrative institutions acting
under broad delegations.").
96. But see Sommer, Independent Agencies as Article I Tribunals: Foundations of a Theory of
Agency Independence, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (1987) (suggesting that independent agencies should be
conceived as "legislative courts" created by Congress under Article I).
97. 0. W. Hoi.~ms, THE COMMON LAw 5 (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience.").
98. See THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed. 1983)
(citing examples).
Vol. 4: 317, 1987
Regulating the Deficit
Perhaps this Court is capable of finding a comfortable resting place in
the notion that independent agencies are not "independent" at all, but
rather firmly ensconced "in" the executive branch, while at the same time
ignoring the implications of Bowsher v. Synar and adhering to the holding
of Humphrey's Executor99 that the President may not remove their
incumbents except on the terms prescribed by Congress.
2. Congressional Oversight
Not only does Bowsher v. Synar raise doubts about the ultimate fate of
the independent agencies, but it also shows the Court's willingness to ex-
tend Chadha to restrict still further Congress's power to supervise and
influence the exercise of broad discretionary authority it has delegated to
administrative decisionmakers. While the techniques that Congress histor-
ically has used to supervise the execution of delegated powers are diffuse
and often informal, recent scholarship suggests that, at least in some con-
texts, they have been remarkably effective.' 0
In Chadha, the Court stated: "Congress must abide by its delegation of
authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked."' 0 ' Even
critics of the Chadha opinion did not believe that the Court intended its
statement to be read literally as invalidating Congress's established "over-
sight" functions over administrative decisionmakers to whom it had dele-
gated broad powers.' 2 However, in Bowsher v. Synar, the majority
expansively restated its Chadha holding: "However, as Chadha makes
clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participa-
tion ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment
only indirectly-by passing new legislation."'0 3 This seems to say that
any attempt by Congress to influence the exercise of delegated powers,
except for passing new legislation, is an unconstitutional interference in
the affairs of the executive branch. Of course, because Congressional over-
sight is generally informal, the courts would find it difficult in practice to
police this rule. But the consequence of even adopting the principle that
Congress may not attempt to influence the exercise of powers which it has
delegated would be a breathtaking change in the structure of the "admin-
istrative state" that has evolved since the New Deal. In the long run, the
99. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
100. See, e.g., Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?: Regula-
tory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. EcON. 765 (1983) (presenting em-
pirical evidence of Congressional control of FTC to support hypothesis of legislative control of inde-
pendent agencies).
101. 462 U.S. at 955.
102. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 24, at 141 (treating as "recognized" congressional power to
engage in oversight); see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 n.19 ("The Constitution provides the Con-
gress with abundant means to oversee and control its administrative creatures.").
103. 106 S. Ct. at 3192 (emphasis supplied).
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Court's step-by-step contraction of Congress's power to influence the
actions of administrative decisionmakers may be far more significant than
the Court's ultimate resolution of the controversy over whether indepen-
dent agency officials can be insulated from removal by the President.
3. Framework Statutes and Shared Powers
During Warren Burger's tenure as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court
seemed determined to categorize all functions of government into three
simple categories: legislative, executive, and judicial. 0 4 Although scholars
have long criticized this "pigeonhole" jurisprudence as an unenlightened
way to approach the problem of marrying the needs of modern govern-
ment to the theory of separation of powers,' the Court continues to insist
that every institution it meets must reside "in" one of the three branches.
The geometric metaphor'0 6 that a particular institution is "in" one of
three "places" then becomes a substitute for further judicial thought (often
a scarce commodity).
The Court's formalistic, pigeonhole approach is particularly unsatisfac-
tory when it confronts a situation which does not fit neatly into either the
executive or the legislative function, but rather involves both branches in
joint or shared activity. Sequestering budgeted funds is surely an example
of a power which is not clearly assigned by the Constitution to either the
President or Congress. The Constitution itself nowhere mentions "seques-
tration," a process developed only recently. In the early 1970's, President
Nixon claimed inherent constitutional authority to sequester or impound
appropriated funds.10 7  The Supreme Court, however, unanimously
rejected the President's assertion of the right to impound funds, albeit on
narrow statutory grounds, in Train v. New York' 0 -a case which is not
104. A few Justices throughout our history have rejected the simplistic concept that every govern-
ment action must fit neatly into one of the three traditional boxes. For example, Justice Holmes's
dissent in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928), recognized that a government
function did not fit tightly within one of the three branches, but rather could be part of an "indiscrim-
inate residue of matters within legislative control," Id. at 212. Similarly, Justice Stevens, concurring
in Bowsher v. Synar, had no difficulty with the related idea that a "legislative" function could be
assigned to an "executive" official. 106 S. Ct. at 3201-02 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, such
feats of conceptual subtlety have never been able to command a majority of the Court.
105. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRArIVE PROCESS, 47-49 (1938) (rejecting rigid, three-branch
analysis of government functions); Strauss, supra note 60, at 578-80, 667 ("rigid separation-of-powers
compartmentalization of government functions should be abandoned in favor of analysis in terms of
...checks and balances.").
106. For a general exploration of the influence of metaphors drawn from geometry on legal
thought, see Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEG.
HIsT. 95 (1986).
107. For a discussion of the impoundment controversies of the early 197 0's, see Abascal &
Kramer, Presidential Impoundment, Part I: Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62
GEo. L.J. 1549 (1974).
108. 420 U.S. 35 (1975); see also Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F.
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even deemed relevant by any of the opinions in Bowsher v. Synar.
Although the President's constitutional authority to impound funds
remained undecided, as a practical matter this controversy was resolved by
enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, which gives the President limited authority to sequester funds, sub-
ject to certain legislative controls.' 9
This history of compromise establishes a strong case for the proposition
that sequestration of funds should be regarded as neither purely "execu-
tive" nor purely "legislative" in character, but rather an instance of a
"shared power."' 0 In the realm of shared powers, where more than one
branch has a role to play,"1' the practice in recent years has been to
resolve inter-branch controversy by passing "framework" statutes which
codify and regulate the roles of respective institutions."1 2 Congress has
passed a number of these statutes including the War Powers Resolution"'
and the Impoundment Control Act of 1974,"" both of which define proce-
dures to be followed in areas of shared powers between the executive and
legislative branches.
The Supreme Court has never clearly resolved the constitutional status
of framework statutes in areas of shared powers, and Bowsher v. Synar
did little to clarify the law on this point. In evaluating a framework stat-
ute in an area of constitutionally-shared powers, the Court should not ask
conceptually (as the majority does in Bowsher v. Synar) whether a partic-
ular act in isolation is "executive" or "legislative" in character. Rather, as
Justice White points out forcefully in his Bowsher dissent,"15 the Court
should evaluate the statutory framework as a whole to determine whether
it is a reasonable implementation of the original constitutional balance
between the branches, or "whether [it] disrupts the proper balance
between the coordinate branches."" '
Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973) (rejecting presidential claim of constitutional authority to impound).
109. 2 U.S.C. § 683 (1982).
110. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (presidential authority is at its maximum when acting pursuant to express or implied
authorization by Congress).
111. I have argued elsewhere that the war power is such a shared power, which can be exercised
only by two branches acting together, since the Constitution makes the President Commander in
Chief, but assigns Congress authority to raise and support armed forces. See Elliott, supra note 24, at
156 n.151.
112. See supra notes 10-11.
113. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
114. 2 U.S.C. §§ 631-642 (1982).
115. 106 S. Ct. at 3214-15 (White, J., dissenting) ("IThe role of this Court should be limited to
determining whether the Act so alters the balance of authority among the branches of government as
to pose a genuine threat to the basic division between the lawmaking power and the power to execute
the law.").
116. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); see also Strauss, supra
note 60, at 605 (although "rigid separation-of-powers arguments" are "unserviceable," "the checks-
and-balances idea retains force.").
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Measured by these standards, the sequestration procedures in Sections
251 and 252 of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings could have been construed to
create a reasonable framework for accomodating both the executive and
the legislative role. Even assuming (as the Court did) that the Comptroller
General is a representative of the legislative branch, rather than indepen-
dent, the Court could still have preserved a significant negotiating position
for the executive by raising doubts about the constitutionality of binding
the President to follow the Comptroller General's report.
That the Court declined to view the sequestration procedures in this
way, and instead stepped in to strike them down, is symptomatic of the
current Court's hostility toward statutory creations that do not fit neatly
into its three boxes: legislative, executive, and judicial. Unfortunately, the
realities of complex, modern government cannot easily be accommodated
to the Court's simplistic conceptualization.
An important mark of judicial maturity, as Justice Holmes pointed out
long ago, is an awareness that legal rules do not have ineffable existences
independent of the purposes for which they were created. The reasons
behind rules should define their reach and application." 7 The constitu-
tional principle of separation of powers was intended to serve as a bul-
wark against "abuse of power.""' In deciding separation of powers cases,
as in other areas of law, the Supreme Court should not apply legal con-
cepts mechanistically without regard to consequences. Rather, the Justices
should always keep in perspective the ultimate goals that a particular
legal concept was created to serve.
Unfortunately, the sense of perspective which distinguishes the wise
judge seems to have been lost in Bowsher v. Synar. As a practical matter,
the Comptroller General of the United States does not represent a serious,
incipient threat to our liberties. In striking down Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings over the role assigned to the Comptroller General, Bowsher v.
Synar bought us little, if anything, in terms of the values that the separa-
tion of powers doctrine was intended to protect, and did so at a high cost
in terms of the damage inflicted on the effort to control the deficit.
B. Bowsher v. Synar and the Deficit
The "vertical" effect of Bowsher v. Synar on efforts to develop legal
mechanisms for managing the deficit is also significant. A casual reader of
the majority opinion in Bowsher v. Synar might get the false impression
that invalidating the Comptroller General's role under Section 251 was
117. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899).
118. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. at 3191.
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not a body blow to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, because the statute creates
a "fallback" provision."' Under the fallback, Congress itself may pass a
joint resolution specifying the sequestrations that are needed to meet the
deficit targets. 20 However, the impression that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
is "alive and well" because Congress can still perform for itself the func-
tion that was formerly delegated to the Comptroller General is mistaken.
This view badly misunderstands the nature of Congress' 2 ' and the pecu-
liar problems that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was designed to overcome.
1. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings as a Regulatory Statute
Congress is not a single entity, but rather a complex institution com-
posed of 535 elected members and a large staff bureaucracy, all with
divergent goals and agendas. As a result, it is not easy to get Congress to
overcome its institutional inertia. Moreover, it is difficult to design a stat-
ute that can force Congress to act. Congress may pass a statute declaring
that it must act to eliminate the deficit (as it did in 198422), and then
ignore its self-imposed mandate (as it did in 1985 with the goals it had set
in 198428). These problems are exacerbated when the necessary action is
particularly unpopular.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was brilliantly designed to overcome these
problems. As my colleague Paul Kahn has pointed out in a provocative
article, 4 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is really a regulatory statute. "What
119. See, e.g., 106 S. Ct. at 3193 ("Fortunately, this is a thicket we need not enter ... Congress
has explicitly provided "fallback" provisions in the Act ....").
120. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings created so-called "fallback provisions" that take effect "[in the
event that any of the reporting provisions described in section 901 [§ 251]. . .are invalidated." 2
U.S.C.A. § 922()(1) (West Supp. 1986). In place of the Comptroller General, the fallback provisions
constitute a "Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction," comprising the entire membership
of the budget committees in both houses of Congress. 2 U.S.C.A. § 922(f)(2) (West Supp, 1986). This
body is supposed to prepare a report, in lieu of the report of the Comptroller General, which sets out
the program-by-program spending reductions which would be necessary to meet the maximum deficit
targets. 2 U.S.C.A. § 922(f)(3) (West Supp. 1986). If-but only if--this report is then passed as a
joint resolution by both houses of Congress it becomes the basis for sequestrations by the President
under § 252. 2 U.S.C.A. § 922(f)(5) (West Supp. 1986).
In reality, then, there is little difference between the "fallback provisions" and Congress passing an
ordinary statute mandating that the President make across-the-board cuts in previously appropriated
funds. Thus, the "fallback provision" lacks the "automatic" character that was crucial if Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings was to work. See infra text accompanying notes 128-32.
121. Lawyers generally misperceive the nature of Congress because they are in the habit of per-
sonifying the institution as a single, coherent lawmaking intelligence. See Elliott, Ackerman & Mil-
lian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, I J. LAW,
ECON. & ORG. 313, 319 (1985).
122. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (to be codified in
scattered Titles of U.S.C.); H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1094.
123. Schiller, Gramm-Rudman: Toothless Dragon, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1986, at A23, col. 3.
124. Kahn, supra note 71, at 185.
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Gramm-Rudman regulates," writes Professor Kahn, "is future
legislation. 25
To see the full implications of Professor Kahn's insight,' 2  consider the
nature of "regulation" as a legal technique. Our concept of regulation,
which developed as our compromise between capitalism and socialism, is a
distinctively American institution. Although leaving control of the means
of production in private hands, the state intervenes in more subtle ways to
influence the conduct of private enterprises. The essential defining charac-
teristic of regulation is that while preserving the nominal freedom of indi-
viduals to make private decisions, regulation attempts to alter the course
of decisions in the aggregate by altering the structure of incentives individ-
uals face when making their decisions. 127
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was a regulatory statute in just this sense.
Like other classic regulatory regimes, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings left
individual regulated parties (members of Congress) nominally free to
make individual decisions, but simultaneously tried to shape the collective
course of their decisions by altering incentives. In Professor Kahn's words:
Controlling future legislative behavior is the essence of the [Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings] Act. . . . Congress has set a rule for
125. Id. at 190.
126. Unfortunately, Kahn himself does not fully develop his insight that Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings is a regulatory statute. Instead, he goes on to argue that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is an
unconstitutional attempt by a "present Congress [to] stipulat[e] limits on what [a] future Congress can
do in the absence of repeal." Id. On this point, the present author must respectfully part company.
In the first place, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is not merely action by "one Congress"; it is a statute,
and therefore it stands on a different juridical footing in our system than would action by Congress
alone. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919 (action by majority of Congress alone cannot make law). This is
one feature that distinguishes our system from systems such as the British in which Parliament is
sovereign, see Finer, Introduction: The Five Constitutions and the British Constitutional Framework
in FIvE CONSTITUTIONS 12, 35 (S. Finer ed. 1979), and therefore one Parliament cannot bind an-
other. See G. WILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
225 (2d ed. 1976) (sovereignty of Parliament is sovereignty " 'for the time being' and any ... [Par-
liament] can repeal a statute made by one of its predecessors"; traditional doctrine holds Parliament
cannot "even impose some special condition or clog on a repeal").
More fundamentally, however, Kahn is incorrect in portraying Gramm-Rudman-Hollings as a
"limit" on action by future Congresses. As he himself points out, the actual effect of the statute is to
alter the incentives that influence future legislation without actually limiting the-freedom of a future
Congress to do anything it wants (including repeal the statute). It cannot be, however, that any statute
that may influence future legislative behavior by altering political incentives is therefore unconstitu-
tional. Consider, for example, a statute which stipulated that congressional elections would be held on
April 16, the day after most people file their federal income tax returns. Such a statute might very
well alter political incentives, and thereby influence future congressional voting on spending and reve-
nue measures, but it would not be unconstitutional for that reason.
127. The regulatory taxes and health warnings currently applied to cigarettes are classic examples
of a distinctively regulatory approach to a problem: People remain legally free to smoke, but by
increasing the price, and reminding people of the costs to their health, the state attempts to discourage
consumption. National policy regarding cigarettes is ambivalent, however, since agricultural subsidies
simultaneously stimulate tobacco production. As with cigarettes, regulation is typically adopted in lieu
of more forceful legal techniques when competing or contradictory values must be accomodated.
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itself-incur no deficit beyond the stipulated maximum-and to
enforce it has adopted a strategy for dealing with violations that sets
a penalty-the automatic, across-the-board spending
reduction-which is both unattractive and simultaneously keeps the
enterprise of deficit reduction from collapsing. 2
Under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, if Congress did not conform its actions
to the deficit targets (or repeal them), other institutions would automati-
cally sequester funds. Since automatic sequestrations would produce
unpleasant political consequences, the threat of these sequestrations was
the "stick" which it was hoped might change political behavior in the
future.
No one knows-and after Bowsher v. Synar, no one ever will
know-whether this approach would have succeeded in altering the
behavior of future Congresses. What is clear, however, is that, to have any
realistic chance of effectively altering the behavior of future Congresses,
the distirictive nature of Congress requires that two conditions be met: (1)
there must be a sanction if Congress fails to reduce the deficit, (2) the
sanction must be automatic, in that it must not require Congress to take
affirmative action to punish itself.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings met both of these conditions, and conse-
quently, there was a reasonable chance that the statute might actually
have worked. The sanction was the threat that, if Congress failed to
reduce the deficit, the budget would be cut across the board, which would
be politically unpopular. The sanction was automatic since the cuts would
have gone into effect without any further action by Congress.
2. The Effect of Bowsher v. Synar
Bowsher v. Synar destroyed the automatic character of the sanction, by
requiring Congress to take affirmative action to impose any sanction for
its own failure to meet the deficit reduction targets. This converted
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings into a hortatory goal statute, like the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984,2 ' which Congress is free to-and almost certainly
will-disregard in the future when it becomes convenient to do so.
To be sure, the mere existence of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings with its
stipulated deficit reduction targets has some effect. Exceeding the targets
will undoubtedly produce some mild political fallout. But it will be
extremely difficult to hold any particular member of Congress (or the
128. Kahn, supra note 71, at 186-87.
129. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (to be codified in
scattered Titles of U.S.C.).
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President) responsible, since by definition the deficit is the composite
result of all spending and revenue decisions.
Thus, by invalidating the portion of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings that
provided for an institution outside of Congress to impose sequestrations if
Congress did not meet the deficit targets through its regular spending and
revenue decisions, the Court in Bowsher v. Synar destroyed the "central
genius"' ° of the statute-the fact that "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings . . .
d[id] not require Congress to do anything to cut the deficit; if Congress
fails to act, cuts go into effect 'automatically.' ""',
From this perspective, the decision in Bowsher v. Synar emerges as
destructive, self-defeating and self-contradictory. The decision is destruc-
tive because Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was gutted, with little or no prac-
tical benefit in terms of separation of powers values. The decision is self-
defeating because the outcome will actually worsen the situation that sup-
posedly concerned the Court. The essence of the majority's complaint in
Bowsher v. Synar was that an officer too closely aligned with Congress,
the Comptroller General, was given the task of making the sequestration
report to the President. After the Court's decision, however, that task now
falls to Congress itself. Finally, the decision is self-contradictory in that
the Bowsher v. Synar Court does not explain why a task too executive to
be performed by an officer aligned with Congress, the Comptroller Gen-
eral, suddenly ceases to be executive at all when it is performed instead by
Congress.1 82
III. Regulating the Deficit
Bowsher v. Synar may not make sense, but the result is now the law.
That restores to the national agenda a question that only a few months
ago Gramm-Rudman- Hollings appeared to have temporarily put behind
us: What legal mechanisms can be devised to control the federal deficit?
This Part approaches that question in three steps. The first section con-
siders the possibility of amending the Constitution to deal with the deficit.
While constitutional change may come later, today the necessary political
conditions for constitutional change do not exist. There is not yet a wide-
spread consensus that the causes of the deficit are inherent in the struc-
ture of our political institutions; most people either still deny that the
deficit is a serious problem, or attribute it to errors by the people in office.
The second section argues that the deficit's causes are indeed built into the
structure of our present political institutions. One cause, which is particu-
130. Elliott, supra note 9, at 1099.
131. Id.
132. 106 S. Ct. at 3201 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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larly relevant because it would be relatively easy to change,1 3 is the
structure of voting in Congress. Voting separately on spending, taxes, and
the size of the deficit provides Congress with little incentive to reach
rational choices. As the history of previous measures to control the deficit
illustrates, better integration of the decisions on taxes, spending, and the
size of the deficit is needed if we are to control our fiscal affairs. In the
third section, the concept of "Dependent Taxation and Budgeting in
Arrears" is proposed as a possible structural reform.
A. Constitutional Regulation of the Deficit
In theory, the best way to regulate spending and revenue decisions after
Bowsher v. Synar might be a constitutional amendment. Constitutional
change to deal with the deficit might take a variety of forms, ranging from
the crude remedy of the Balanced Budget Amendment"" to more subtle
forms of institutional change. Like Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, more sub-
tle changes would not prohibit deficits outright, but would attack them
indirectly by changing the incentives for decisionmakers 35
133. Obviously a large number of factors come together to produce the deficit, from historical
changes in our society's conception of the proper role of the federal government to changes in the
position of the U.S. in the world economy. From a legal standpoint, however, the relevant cause of the
deficit should be considered the factor that "could be most easily controlled." Calabresi, Concerning
Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CI. L. REV. 69, 105-06
(1975).
134. The following resolution introduced in the 99th Congress incorporates the essential features
of the different versions of the so-called Balanced Budget Amendment:
SECTrION 1 Prior to each fiscal year, the Congress shall adopt a statement of receipts and
outlays for that year in which total outlays are not greater than total receipts. The Congress
may amend such statement provided revised outlays are not greater than revised receipts.
Whenever three-fifths of the whole number of both Houses shall deem it necessary, Congress
in such statement may provide for specific excess outlays over receipts by a vote directed solely
to that subject. The Congress and the President shall ensure, pursuant to legislation or through
exercise of their powers under the first and second articles, that actual outlays do not exceed
the outlays set forth in such statement.
SECTrIoN 2 Total receipts for any fiscal year set forth in the statement adopted pursuant to this
article shall not increase by a rate greater than the rate of increase in national income in the
year or years ending not less than six months not more than twelve months before such fiscal
year, unless a majority of the whole number of both Houses of Congress shall have passed a
bill directed solely to approving specific additional receipts and such bill has become law.
SECTION 3 Prior to each fiscal year, the President shall transmit to Congress a proposed state-
ment of receipts and outlays for that year consistent with the provisions of this article.
SECTION 4 The Congress may waive the provisions of this article for any fiscal year in which a
declaration of war is in effect.
SECTION 5 Total receipts shall include all receipts of the United States except those derived
from borrowing and total outlays shall include all outlays of the United States except those for
repayment of debt principal.
SECTION 6 The Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation.
SECTION 7 This article shall take effect for the second fiscal year beginning after its
ratification.
S.J. Res. 5, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S335 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985).
135. Elsewhere I have suggested modifying the terms of election to the Senate as an example of
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Elsewhere I have argued against the Balanced Budget Amendment, but
in favor of a constitutional convention to consider more subtle forms of
constitutional change that would restructure our political institutions to
make them better able to deal with the deficit.136 I will not repeat those
arguments here. It must be acknowledged, however, that we no longer
seem on the verge of constitutional revision to address the deficit. The
enactment of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings took some of the steam out of the
movement to call a constitutional convention. In addition, as the economy
has improved, the public seems less concerned than it was a few years ago
that large federal deficits are on the verge of causing economic ruin.
These developments can be put into perspective by considering a theory
of constitutional revision proposed recently by Professor Bruce Ackerman.
According to Professor Ackerman, true constitutional change occurs only
during infrequent "constitutional moments," when an aroused citizenry
demands changes in the fundamental legal order. "We the People" then
lapse back into the somnolence of "normal politics,"' in which politicians
are relatively free to go about their business unencumbered by interfer-
ence from the public. 187 According to Professor Ackerman, past examples
of constitutional moments include the American Revolution, the Civil
War, and the New Deal.188
Ackerman's description of American political history rings true, but as
yet he has told us relatively little about what characterizes a constitutional
moment. One factor (among others) is surely important: a general public
perception that problems are structural, rather than merely political in
nature. The perceived source of problems, not their seriousness, distin-
guishes true constitutional moments from normal politics. During periods
of normal politics, the perceived solution to the country's problems is to
"throw the rascals out"-to use elections to replace people who have been
making wrong decisions with people who will make better decisions. A
constitutional moment, on the other hand, begins when people realize that
throwing the rascals out will not suffice; the problem is no longer per-
ceived as solvable merely by replacing the people in authority. Rather, the
structure of authority itself must be changed.
institutional change that would affect the deficit indirectly by changing incentives. Elliott, supra note
9, at 1105-06. In the same spirit others have suggested closer ties between the legislative and the
executive. See, e.g., Cutler, To Form a Government (1980), reprinted in REFORMING AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT: THE BICENTENNIAL PAPERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYS-
TEM 11-23 (D. Robinson ed. 1985) [hereinafter REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT].
136. Elliott, supra note 9.
137. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022
(1984).
138. Id. at 1051-52.
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When (and if) a substantial majority of the American people become
convinced that the problem of the deficit transcends whether the Republi-
cans or the Democrats control Congress or the White House, or even
which candidates are elected in the next presidential election, then we will
be on the verge of constitutional change to control the deficit. But constitu-
tional change is unlikely until there is a general consensus that the deficit
is caused by flaws in the structure of our institutions that affect whoever is
exercising power. The necessary awareness that the causes of the deficit
are built into our political institutions is beginning to develop, but we
have not yet reached a true constitutional moment in Ackerman's terms.
This can be illustrated by contrasting recent statements by prominent po-
litical figures.
David Stockman, a former member of Congress, served as Director of
the Office of Management and Budget from 1981 to 1985. Always a con-
troversial figure, Stockman engineered the Reagan Administration's pro-
gram of cutting domestic spending. Upon leaving government, Stockman
wrote an equally controversial book, The Triumph of Politics, which is
his personal account of why the war on the deficit was lost.'" 9 Fascinating
reading for anyone interested in the deficit, the book describes Stockman's
efforts to cut spending and the political forces that consistently frustrated
those efforts, sometimes partially, sometimes completely.
At the end of The Triumph of Politics, one might expect Stockman to
be resigned to the fact that the triumph of politics over economic policy is
endemic to American political institutions. Surprisingly, however, in his
final chapter, hope springs eternal in David Stockman's breast that things
could have been different, and will be different, if only politicians will
stop acting like politicians:
Our budget is now drastically out of balance not because this condi-
tion is endemic to our politics. Rather, it is the consequence of an
accident of governance which occurred in 1981. That it persists is
due to the untenable anti-tax position of the White House. After five
years of presidential intransigence, all of the normal mechanisms of
economic goverance have become ensnared in a web of folly. But this
condition can be remedied whenever the White House decides to face
the facts of life. 140
In imagining that the fiscal events of the last few years could have been
otherwise if only certain people in high office had behaved differently, 4 '
139. D. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION (1987).
140. Id. at 426.
141. This is not the place to refute Stockman's naive hope that it is merely an "accident of gov-
ernance" that the politicians who have risen successfully through our political system favor spending
and oppose taxes.
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Stockman provides a prototypical example of viewing the deficit in terms
of "normal politics": The source of the problem is the people in authority,
not the structure of authority itself.
So long as most people interpret events as Stockman does, we will not
reach a constitutional moment. Unless and until we become convinced that
people in office behave as they do because of the institutional structures in
which they operate, we will blame the particular people in office, not the
structure of institutions.
An example from the opposite end of the spectrum is a recent letter to
the editor of the Washington Post by former Senator J. William Ful-
bright, who writes:
It is difficult for me not to believe, in view of our recently becoming
the world's largest debtor with the world's largest domestic deficit
and the largest deficit in our balance of trade, that the other democ-
racies [in which legislatures select the principal executive officials]
are better organized to manage these affairs than we are.1""
In attributing our economic problems, including the deficit, to the organi-
zation of our political institutions, Fulbright exemplifies a view of the def-
icit that must be broadly held before constitutional change to deal with the
deficit can occur.
A growing number of thoughtful people agree with Fulbright that the
causes of the deficit (and the deeper economic problems that it symbolizes)
lie not in the transient politics of the moment but go deeper into the very
structure of our political institutions. Former White House Counsel Lloyd
Cutler and former Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillion recently
formed the "Committee on the Constitutional System" to discuss and pub-
licize the idea that many of our problems are traceable to the structure of
our constitutional system. "The deadlock over the deficit" is cited in the
Committee's papers as a primary "indication that the problems [are]
structural, rather than personal, and seem likely to persist, no matter who
wins various electoral contests. 148
Creating a political consensus for institutional reform at the constitu-
tional level is the purpose of the Committee on the Constitutional System,
but it will be a long and arduous process. In 1985, I imagined that if
efforts to deal with the deficit "continue[] for the next decade as [they]
ha[ve] for the last, with politicians posturing and attempting to shift re-
142. Fulbright, The Executive Should Be Chosen By Congress, Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1987, at A22,
col. 3.
143. REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 135, at 1.
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sponsibility to one another, but without any real reform . . . [,] many
more of us will be prepared to consider the possibility that the deficit is
merely the surface symptom of a more fundamental imbalance in our
political institutions which cannot be remedied short of some form of con-
stitutional change." 14' If anything, it was overly optimistic to think that a
consensus for constitutional change could emerge within a decade.
In the meantime, it is important for several reasons to explore legal
mechanisms for dealing with the deficit short of constitutional change,
even if one is convinced that some form of constitutional change is ulti-
mately necessary. First, since constitutional change may not be in the off-
ing, it would be irresponsible to fail to use the tools at hand. Second,
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings illustrates that it may be possible to change
institutional incentives without amending the Constitution.1" Third, pur-
suing available statutory remedies may be the most effective way to hasten
constitutional change in the long run. Just as the failures of the Articles of
Confederation laid the groundwork for the Constitutional Convention of
1787, a history demonstrating clearly that our present institutions are sim-
ply incapable of managing the deficit (and the deeper economic and politi-
cal problems that it symbolizes) is a necessary step toward building the
political consensus for our next constitutional moment.
B. The Rules of the Legislative Game and the Deficit
The design of possible statutory changes to remedy an out-of-control
deficit depends on first developing a theory of institutional causes of the
deficit that can be addressed by statute. 46 Outgoing Senator Charles
Mathias Jr. provides the starting point for such a theory. Senator Ma-
thias, a veteran of eighteen years in the Senate and eight years in the
House, was asked by a newspaper interviewer recently, "How well is the
system functioning?" He answered:
Well, we've got a $2 trillion national debt, we've got a $200 billion
trade deficit, we've got a $220 billion budget deficit. We've got
problems. And that has to reflect some miscalculations in the system.
So the answer I would have to give you is, no, it's not working the
way it ought to work . .. ."'
144. Elliott, supra note 9, at 1097.
145. See id. at 1097. It should be noted, however, that the lesson to be learned from Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings is ambiguous. After all, the Supreme Court did hold that the institutional changes
made by that statute could not be made without amending the Constitution.
146. See supra note 133.
147. Mathias, Reflections on a System Spinning Out of Control, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1986, at
A21, col. 2.
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Later in the same interview, Senator Mathias expanded on this theme:
The system doesn't work. You know, the Constitution, as I see it,
was based on the principle that people would be rational. They
would employ the reason that God gave them. And when they don't,
the Constitution doesn't work very well. Just for example, you can
look at the roll call. There were people who voted for the tax cut in
'81, and against the budget cuts. Just expose that to the light of day
a little bit and you see why we're headed into this kind of trouble
that we are in.148
Senator Mathias assumes that something must be wrong with the sys-
tem, but he is unable to diagnose what it is. He is right that in voting on
fiscal matters, legislators do not appear t6 be using "the reason that God
gave them." What he does not see is that the organization of our political
system creates strong incentives for politicians who face frequent elections
to behave irresponsibly on fiscal matters, and little or no countervailing
incentives to act in accordance with "the reason that God gave them."
This is not the time or place to attempt a full account of the incentives
that operate on members of Congress, a topic that is already the subject of
a voluminous literature in political science.' 49 It suffices to say that, to the
limited extent that issues affect congressional elections at all, voters are
more sensitive to whether they agree with their representatives' "stands"
on a few high-visibility issues than they are to the results of government
policy as a whole. 150 Thus, while voters may pay some attention to
whether they agree with t&-! way their representative voted on certain iso-
lated issues, such as raising their taxes or cutting their food stamps, they
generally do not hold their representatives individually responsible for the
overall results of government policy such as the deficit.
Consequently, discipline on fiscal matters must come from the internal
structure of Congress, rather than the electoral process.' In the past,
148. Id. at A21, col. 3 (emphasis supplied).
149. See, e.g., M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
(1977); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
For representative works that analyze the specific problem of the deficit from this standpoint, see A.
WILDAVSKY, How To LIMIT GOVERNMENT SPENDING (1980); J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, DE-
MOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (1977); Elliott, supra note 9.
150. M. FIORINA, supra note 149, at 41-45 (voters do not hold "their" representatives responsi-
ble for actions of government as whole).
151. Public concern about the "deficit issue" can, however, create political conditions for struc-
tural reforms such as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Further research is needed to decide how changing
political incentives may lead to broad, public interest legislation. For the suggestion that the threat of
a constitutional convention created a "politicians' dilemma" that led to the passage of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, see Elliott, supra note 9, at 1103-04. See also Mashaw, A Comment on Causa-
tion, Law Reform, and Guerilla Warfare, 73 GEo. L.J. 1393, 1396 (1985) (plaintiffs' victories in
toxic tort cases may mobilize industry to lobby for statutory reform).
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aggregations of power such as strong political parties, and the seniority
system in Congress provided some discipline, but in recent years, these
structures have eroded.16 The possibility of reform should focus on the
internal structure of Congress. Under the traditional voting rules of Con-
gress, legislators vote seriatim on spending, revenue, and deficit decisions,
treating them as if they were separate, unrelated issues. There is no pro-
cedure requiring votes to reflect a consistent fiscal policy, or to trade off
competing objectives. 5 ' Given the rules of this game, in which each vote is
independent of every other vote, it is perfectly rational (in terms of the
rules of the game) for legislators to vote in favor of eliminating the deficit,
but in favor of increasing spending, and also in favor of cutting taxes. The
way the issues are framed is: "Do you prefer a smaller deficit to a larger
deficit?"; "Do you prefer more or less spending on worthwhile programs
such as hospitals and schools?"; "Do you prefer larger or smaller taxes on
your constituents?" When the issues are put that way, most legislators
probably would vote in favor of (1) eliminating the deficit, (2) cutting
taxes, and (3) increasing federal spending.
Contrary to Senator Mathias' views, there is nothing irrational or in-
consistent about holding all three of these goals simultaneously as prefer-
ences. The problem arises if it is not possible to achieve all three in prac-
tice. What is irrational is the existence of a legislative decision procedure
that does not subordinate votes about preferences to the dictates of practi-
cal reality. Absent a procedure to coordinate votes on separate spending
and revenue decisions, it is predictable (perhaps even inevitable) that a
thousand small decisions will reach an outcome that is different from what
would have been preferred on the aggregate issue. 5 Rather than al-
lowing issues to be addressed seriatim, decision procedures should reflect
the fact that a decision on one issue has consequences for others.
Of course, as Senator Mathias intimates, legislators' intuitions may tell
them that it is impossible to obtain a lower deficit, lower taxes, and higher
spending, but experience demonstrates that this factor alone is too weak to
discipline voting. Only if the decision procedure mirrors the constraints
imposed by reality can we expect the outcome to maximize the achieve-
ment of our shared goals.
152. See Elliott, supra note 9, at 1101-02.
153. The institutional inertia of Congress imposes a certain obligation to trade off competing goals
in that not everything that an individual would like can be passed. However, the situation is still a
"plus sum game," rather than the division of a fixed pie. If two politicians agree to vote for each
other's pet projects, they are both better off, without regard to whether the country can afford both at
once.
154. See generally Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, in MIcRoMoTvVFS AND
MACROBEI-IAVIOR 9 (T. Schelling ed. 1978) (rational responses by individuals to micromotives can
lead to non-desirable situations at collective level).
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While the perverse incentives generated by congressional voting proce-
dures have not attracted explicit attention in previous accounts of the
causes of the deficit, the major reforms directed at controlling the deficit in
recent years-the Congressional Budgeting and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974158 ("1974 Budget Act") and Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in
1985-may be understood as attempts, albeit imperfect ones, to alter the
rules of the legislative "game" of voting on budgetary decisions.
Under the 1974 Budget Act, Congress first enacts comprehensive
budget resolutions to set spending targets. In theory, the sum of individual
spending measures is supposed to stay within these limits. Thus, the 1974
Budget Act attempts to convert congressional votes on spending programs
from a "plus sum game," in which individual members of Congress bene-
fit more by spending more, into a "zero sum game," in which each spend-
ing program has to compete with every other spending program for the
limited pool of resources fixed by the budget resolution.
The changes initiated by the 1974 Budget Act were a step in the right
direction, but they did not succeed. First, the procedure established by the
1974 Budget Act failed to establish a pool of resources that was actually
finite and fixed. The aggregate spending goals eventually became merely
totals of the spending programs authorized by appropriations committees
in various areas, rather than acting as genuine constraints.15 6 In addition,
the 1974 Budget Act was deficient in that it only partially integrated con-
gressional votes on budgetary matters: While the 1974 procedure pur-
ported to aggregate spending votes through the budget resolutions, voting
on revenue matters was not tied to the results of votes on the budget reso-
lutions. Thus, under the rules of the legislative game as modified by the
1974 Budget Act, it remained rational for a member of Congress to vote
for aggregate spending of $800 billion and taxes of only $600 billion, even
though he or she also opposed a deficit. Spending and revenue decisions
remained de-coupled.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings built on the reforms of the 1974 Budget Act
but carried them a step further. First, like the 1974 Budget Act, it
attempted to establish a zero sum game on the spending side by establish-
ing deficit targets over five years. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings went beyond
the 1974 Budget Act, however, by creating a more credible mechanism for
155. 2 U.S.C. §§ 631-642 (1982). For a good summary of the history and provisions of the 1974
Congressional Budget Act, see A. SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING AND
TAXING 17-18, 307-414 (1980).
156. See Schick, The First Five Years of Congressional Budgeting, in THE CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET PROCESS AFTER FIVE YEARS 3, 27 (R. Penner ed. 1981) ("Those who wanted the congres-
sional budget to be a contest over national priorities have been greatly disappointed.").
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enforcing the aggregate targets, namely the automatic sequestration proce-
dures of Sections 251 and 252.
In addition, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was the first budgetary reform
to link votes on spending and revenues, although this linkage remained
indirect. The aggregate limits under the 1974 Budget Act took into
account only spending, not revenues. Under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,
however, the aggregate amount of spending that Congress permitted itself
was also a function of its revenue decisions. Because the aggregate targets
under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings were not just spending limits (as in the
past), but deficit targets, they implicitly took into account revenue as well.
Thus, the new rules of the congressional voting game at least implicitly
placed votes on reducing taxes in competition with votes on raising
spending.
To be sure, under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings the linkage between tax-
ing and spending operated only on Congress as whole, not on the votes of
individual members. This was a material deficiency, since correct incen-
tives for action by a collective body, such as Congress, do not necessarily
equate with correct incentives for the body's individual members who
actually make the decisions.l"' Nonetheless, for the first time, a zero sum
game for voting was created which mirrored the zero sum game between
spending, revenues, and taxes. If Congress were to vote to increase spend-
ing, it would be forced to face the fact that either the deficit would in-
crease or taxes would have to be raised. For the first time, all three terms
of the equation-spending, revenues, and deficit-were linked.
From the standpoint of altering incentives for congressional voting
behavior, however, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings did suffer from serious de-
ficiencies. One was that the linkage between taxes and spending was at-
tenuated and indirect. When voting on particular spending programs,
members of Congress were not simultaneously taking a position on raising
taxes. Because Gramm-Rudman-Hollings operated prospectively, based
on predictions about the revenues that would be raised under the existing
tax system, the system incorporated uncertainty which allowed politicians
to adopt inconsistent positions without appearing to do so. One could still
vote for spending programs but against taxes to pay for them without
admitting to the public (or to one's self) that the deficit would be
increased.
Thus, while in theory Gramm-Rudman-Hollings created a zero sum
voting game among spending, taxes, and deficit, in practice it did not.
Because projections of future governmental revenues are indefinite and
highly sensitive to assumptions made about the future health of the econ-
157. See Schelling, supra note 154, at 17-18, 307-414.
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omy, a great deal of discretion, flexibility, and, for politicians, room to
deny the laws of arithmetic, was built into the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
system.158
A final deficiency in the incentive structure established by Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings is that it did not establish true parity between spending
reductions and tax increases as alternative methods for meeting the deficit
targets. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings took the projected level of federal reve-
nues as given, and modified the level of spending to meet the deficit
targets. As a matter of arithmetic, however, the size of the deficit is af-
fected equally by either spending reductions or tax increases. By creating
a mechanism for automatic spending reductions, but requiring a very visi-
ble vote to raise taxes, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings biased the outcome
toward reducing spending rather than increasing taxes to meet the targets.
In fairness, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings did not prohibit Congress from
meeting the deficit targets by raising taxes, rather than by reducing spend-
ing. The threat by the Reagan Administration to veto any tax increase,
however, made that approach theoretical rather than practical in the near
term.
C. A Modest Proposal: Dependent Taxation and Budgeting in Arrears
These deficiencies in past attempts to revise the rules of the legislative
voting game point the way to possible reforms. The goal guiding reforms
should be to create a system of rules for aggregating congressional votes
which mirrors the actual effect of government decisions. In particular, the
fact that the level of the ,.eficit is dependent on the aggregate levels of
spending and revenues should be built into the legislative decision
procedure.
Various procedures can be imagined which would meet this goal. One
possibility is outlined below. It is called "Dependent Taxation and
Budgeting in Arrears" and is built on two key premises:
(1) once appropriate deficit targets are established, spending deci-
sions should be linked to revenue decisions.
(2) actual figures, not estimates, should form the basis for computa-
tions of the deficit and spending reductions or tax increases.
The essence of Dependent Taxation and Budgeting in Arrears is that
decisions by Congress and the President about a tolerable level for the
158. Thus, in some instances, the Comptroller General's role under § 251 is not merely ministe-
rial, but encompasses a great deal of discretion; this is probably the reason that Congress has been
unwilling to amend Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in the wake of Bowsher v. Synar to give the § 251
powers originally assigned to the Comptroller General to an official of the executive branch, such as
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
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deficit and the proper level of government spending should imply a rate of
taxation.'" In other words, rather than viewing the amount of revenues to
be generated as a separate decision to be made by Congress each year,
Congress should acknowledge that by deciding the size of the deficit and
the amount of spending, it has already determined the necessary level of
taxation-hence, the term "Dependent Taxation."
To implement this program, Congress could amend the tax code to pro-
vide that all existing taxes rates for the coming year would be uniformly
raised or lowered pro rata through an administrative proceeding to levels
which would have been sufficient to meet the deficit targets for a preced-
ing year. Thus, tax rates for 1988 would be indexed to the deficit for
1987.
Alternatively, spending decisions could be indexed to the amount of rev-
enue actually raised. Practical problems of planning government programs
might make it more desirable, however, to link future taxes to actual
spending, rather than the other way around, so that tax rates rather than
spending levels would fluctuate. From the perspective of changing con-
gressional voting incentives, however, it does not matter whether spending
is linked to taxes, or taxes are linked to spending; the important point is
that decisions on one side of the fiscal equation should automatically affect
the other.
The primary advantage of this procedure is that it would force Con-
gress and the President to acknowledge the arithmetic relationship
between deficits, spending, and revenues.160 In addition, since computa-
tions would be based on actual experience in a preceding year, discretion
to "cook the books" to avoid the relationship among the three would be
reduced (although, admittedly, not eliminated).
159. A somewhat similar concept was suggested by Franco Modigliani, Professor of Economics
and Finance at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in testimony about Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings before Congress's Joint Economic Committee. The Gramm-Rudman Budget Proposal:
Hearings Before the Joint Economics Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1985) (statement of Franco
Modigliani).
160. 1 am not unaware that Keynesians (and "supply-siders") maintain that the true relationship
between spending and revenues is not strictly arithmetic, because under certain conditions, deficits
may stimulate the economy, thereby producing greater revenues to the government through the income
tax. However, this effect should be counterbalanced by the government's running a surplus when the
economy is "overheated" during periods of high inflation. It seems impractical to modify congressional
voting rules depending upon the state of the economy. Therefore, it seems better to adopt voting
procedures which are fiscally neutral rather than biased for or against deficits. It should be noted,
however, that nothing in what I call "zero sum game" voting rules would preclude a conscious deci-
sion to run a deficit for macro-economic reasons. The problem I am addressing in the text is the
opposite: where the conscious decision would be not to have a deficit (or to have only a smaller
deficit), but voting procedures build in incentives to deviate from the aggregate decision in the results
of a series of individual votes.
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A subsidiary, but not trivial, advantage is that the suggested procedure
would be constitutional. It has long since been settled that fixing the level
of a tax or tariff may be delegated to administrative officials in the execu-
tive branch. 1' Congress has been understandably unwilling to give a
political official in the executive branch the power, originally delegated to
the Comptroller General by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, to make discre-
tionary estimates of future deficits. Similar concerns should not, however,
attend giving an administrator in the executive branch the function of
computing the pro rata increase or decrease in marginal rates of taxation
necessary to meet the deficit targets for a preceding year. Judicial review
would be available to insure that administrative decisionmakers adhered
to the legislative standard in fixing rates.
Another practical, political advantage of the Dependent Taxation and
Budgeting in Arrears approach is that it does not prejudge the controver-
sial political issue of whether spending reductions or tax increases should
be used to meet deficit targets. Rather, it simply establishes the priority of
the statutory deficit targets (which are, of course, subject to repeal or
modification).
Like Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, Dependent Taxation and Budgeting
in Arrears is a regulatory approach that attempts to alter the political
incentives for Congress and the President in making future budgetary de-
cisions, rather than eliminate their discretion to decide on the appropriate
deficit level. In contrast to the proposed Balanced Budget Amendment, the
suggested Dependent Taxation and Budgeting in Arrears approach would
not tie the hands of the go,,ernment in fiscal policy. The proposal rests on
the premise that if a politician advocates spending a certain amount of
money, he or she should be forced to acknowledge that either taxes or the
deficit will increase by an equivalent amount. If we wish to retain the
flexibility to make discretionary decisions about the level of the deficit for
macroeconomic reasons, we should decide on the level of the deficit first,
but then we should tie tax rates to the level of spending. Therefore, in
place of the "stick" of automatic spending reductions, which the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional in Bowsher v. Synar, the proposal for Depen-
dent Taxation and Budgeting in Arrears substitutes the threat of auto-
matic, across-the-board tax increases.
The proposed statute is not a panacea; it only attempts to redress per-
verse incentives created by rules for congressional voting on fiscal matters.
While these rules may contribute to the deficit, there is no reason to be-
lieve that they are its only or primary cause. Other factors inherent in our
161. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (Congress can delegate its power to
fix level of customs duties).
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political institutions also bias the political process in favor of deficits, and
the measures suggested here will do nothing to redress those imbalances.
Because so many factors interact to produce the deficit, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to predict the ultimate success of any reform directed at one of
a multiplicity of causes. The fact remains, however, that the approach
suggested here might be a step worth taking. Such a step would be major
and undoubtedly requires further study and refinement. But those who
would reject it out of hand as politically impractical should consider that
only a few years ago the proposals adopted as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
would have seemed equally visionary.
IV. Conclusion: Framework Statutes and the Constitution
From almost any perspective, the Supreme Court's opinion in Bowsher
v. Synar is a disappointment. For many different reasons, Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings was significant legislation. It was passed to deal with a
major national crisis. It adopted a new and creative approach to regulat-
ing the deficit. It raised interesting and important constitutional issues of
the first magnitude.
Unfortunately, however, the Court's opinion does not reflect these fac-
tors. Instead, the Court invalidated the statute on a technicality. Perhaps
the Court was wise to avoid deciding the real issues. Courts do not sit for
the purpose of writing opinions that satisfy the curiosity of law professors.
On the other hand, from the standpoint of constitutional history and the
evolution of our governmental institutions, Bowsher v. Synar raises more
questions than it answers.
Professor Kahn's article162 defines the real issue better than the Court's
opinion does: "the capacity of Congress to control the future" through
statutes. 6 ' By my lights, however, Kahn misstates the issue and reaches
the wrong conclusion. The question is not really whether one Congress
may control a future Congress; it is rather whether the United States gov-
ernment as a whole may regulate its future operations by statute, or alter-
natively, whether the only legal procedure that may validly perform this
function is a constitutional amendment.
In my view, both as a matter of prudent policy and constitutional law,
statutes that create a framework to regulate the future operations of gov-
ernment should be recognized as valid, provided they supplement rather
than alter the original constitutional design. When Congress passes a
framework statute, it is acting under the necessary and proper clause to
162. Kahn, supra note 71.
163. Id. at 186, 188.
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supplement the original constitutional assignment of functions, and its
handiwork should be upheld unless it violates "the letter" or "the spirit"
of the Constitution.1 64
"We act through governmental institutions which are rightly revered
for their age and admired for their adaptability," write Harold Edgar and
Benno Schmidt."' The central challenge of our separation of powers
jurisprudence is to maintain the wisdom we revere in our constitutional
tradition without sacrificing the adaptability we need in our governmental
institutions.
Regrettably, Bowsher v. Synar contributes nothing to that enterprise.
164. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
165. Edgar & Schmidt, Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security
Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 350 (1986).
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